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Jeffrey M. Hirsch* and Barry T. Hirsch** 
In this Article, we ask whether the National Labor Relations Act, enacted over 70 
years ago, can remain relevant in a competitive economy where nonunion employer 
discretion is the dominant form of workplace governance.  The best opportunity for 
the NLRA’s continued relevance is the modification of its language and 
interpretation to enhance worker voice and participation in the nonunion private 
sector, without imposing undue costs on employers.  Examples of such reforms 
include narrowing the NLRA’s company union prohibition; implementing a 
conditional deregulation system that relies on consent by an independent employee 
association; changing the labor law default to some form of a nonunion work group; 
expanding state and local authority over labor relations; and encouraging NLRA 
protection for employee use of employer-owned Internet services.  These legal 
innovations have the potential to be welfare enhancing, as compared to outcomes 
likely to evolve under the current legal framework.  Although the political likelihood 
of such changes is currently low, steps in this direction could result in an increased 
relevance for the NLRA in the modern economy. 
The National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA” or “Act”) of 19351 provided the legal 
framework that ushered in union organizing, collective bargaining, and a sharp rise in private 
sector unionism in the United States during the early and mid-twentieth century.  Since that time, 
the role and relevance of the NLRA has narrowed as private sector union density has eroded.2 In 
today’s competitive environment, the dominant form of workplace governance lacks the 
presence of a union; it is a governance structure under which management has unilateral, albeit 
constrained, discretion with respect to most aspects of the workplace.  This dominance is so 
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2complete that reforms in the NLRA cannot restore traditional unionism to its previous level.  
Designed for a different era and type of workplace, the NLRA’s 1930s vision of bargaining 
relationships has limited relevance today.  One result of this transformation is an unmet desire of 
many nonunion workers for opportunities to express individual and collective voice in 
cooperation with their employers, albeit in a form different from what exists in most traditional 
union establishments. 
This Article explores changes in labor law and public policy that might satisfy this unmet 
desire by promoting welfare-enhancing worker voice, participation, and cooperation in the 
United States labor market, in particular for nonunion private sector workers.3 Underlying this 
assessment of possible regulatory change is the reality that in today’s competitive environment, 
the dominant form of employee governance is one in which management has unilateral 
discretion with respect to most aspects of the workplace environment, albeit constrained by 
societal norms and the need for employers to attract and retain capable employees.  This reality 
is reflected in the declining fortunes of traditional private sector unionism—a decline that does 
not look to be reversed in today’s increasingly competitive economic environment.   
Most labor reforms, including some discussed here, were originally proposed with the 
intent of either encouraging or discouraging traditional unionism.  Our concern, however, is not 
with the promotion of an arguably out-dated model of collective representation.  Rather, our 
analysis recognizes that traditional unionism will remain a small part of the economy’s private 
sector and focuses on reforms that, given this fact, are welfare enhancing for society as a whole.  
The focus of this Article’s proposals, therefore, is to facilitate welfare-enhancing employee voice 
and participation in an economy where few private sector employees will be represented by 
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3traditional unions. 
We use the term “welfare enhancing” to indicate that the societal benefits from a change 
exceed its costs, with benefits and costs interpreted broadly to include nonmonetary as well as 
monetary effects.  Of course, reliable estimation of the benefits and costs associated with labor 
regulations is exceedingly difficult.4 Therefore, while we cannot state with certainty that our 
proposals would be successful, they represent promising opportunities to enhance overall welfare 
by expanding worker voice and cooperation without imposing undue costs on—and perhaps 
providing benefits to—employers. 
The need for welfare-enhancing labor reform is well-illustrated by the contrast between 
the NLRA’s policies and antiquated view of the workplace, and the workplace as it currently 
exists.  The original version of the NLRA was enacted in 1935 as the Wagner Act.  A key goal of 
the Act was to promote national commerce, which had faced major disruptions due to labor 
unrest,5 by “protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self-organization, 
and designation of representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms 
and conditions of their employment.”6 The Wagner Act’s endorsement of collective action7 was 
tempered by the Taft-Hartley Act’s amendments to the NLRA in 1947.  Although not mutually 
exclusive with the purposes of the Wagner Act, the Taft-Hartley amendments emphasized, 
among other things, the goal of protecting employee free choice—specifically the choice not to 
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4seek collective representation.8 The resulting NLRA, therefore, has a strong aim to promote and 
protect employees’ ability to freely choose whether or not to engage in collective action or 
representation.  This policy goal is not limited to choices about traditional unionism, however.  
Collective action may take many forms, and employees’ freedom to choose unconventional 
means to exercise their collective rights is firmly within the protection of the Act.9
The NLRA’s statutory language is vague enough to protect, at least theoretically, ever-
changing forms of collective action—even forms found in a modern workplace that are vastly 
different from what existed in 1935.  Many manufacturing jobs have been replaced by positions 
that stress service or intellectual skills.10 The strict hierarchy that once existed in most 
workplaces has eroded as many businesses seek flexibility, information sharing, and more 
decentralized management.11 Although the broad scope of the NLRA’s language is generally 
capable of taking these changes into account, the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB” or 
“Board”), the agency that enforces the NLRA, has been surprisingly reluctant to support these 
changes.  Some of the NLRA’s provisions are beyond the Board’s control, however, and several 
have become obsolete or even detrimental in the contemporary economy.12 Thus, both flexible 
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5enforcement and statutory changes in the NLRA are warranted. 
Part I of this Article examines the rise and fall of private sector unionism in the U.S. and 
addresses the reasons that managerial discretion, rather than union-negotiated agreements, has 
emerged as the dominant form of workplace governance.  Part II explores private sector workers’ 
desire for more voice and cooperation in the workplace and describes ways in which that desire 
may be satisfied.  Finally, Part III evaluates several labor regulations changes that may be 
welfare enhancing, providing greater opportunities for employee voice and participation while 
being economically sustainable in a competitive economic environment. 
I. IS THE NLRA RELEVANT IN TODAY’S WORKPLACE?
A. Private Sector Unionism in Decline 
It is undisputed that unionism in the private sector has long been in decline.  Private 
sector union density13 was about one-in-three workers in the early 1950s, falling to nearly one-
in-five workers by the end of the 1970s.14 Although the number of private sector workers 
climbed from 66.1 million to 105.5 million workers between 1977 and 2005, union membership 
declined from 14.34 million to 8.26 million.15 This translates into a union membership density 
decrease from 21.7% (or 23.3% covered by a collective-bargaining agreement) in 1977 to only 
7.8% (8.5% covered) in 2005.16 Particularly sharp declines occurred in sectors highly organized 
in the past.  Between 1977 and 2005, membership density fell from 35.5% (37.6% covered) to 
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where indicated, covered by a union-negotiated collective-bargaining agreement. 
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15 See http://www.unionstats.com (compiling data since 1973 from the Current Population Survey (“CPS”), the 
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613.0% (13.7% covered) in manufacturing and from 35.9% (37.6% covered) to 13.1% (13.8% 
covered) in construction.17 It is difficult to identify any large industry in which private sector 
union density has not diminished. 
Nor has private sector unionization ended its decline.  Union density is affected by flows 
in and out of “stocks” of union and nonunion employment.  In any given year, large numbers of 
union and nonunion jobs are lost and large numbers of mostly nonunion jobs are created.  For 
density to remain constant in a growing economy, union organizing of existing and new 
nonunion jobs, plus employment increases in already-unionized companies, must exceed the 
number of union jobs lost.  Organizing since the early 1980s has fallen well short of the 
conditions to hold density constant; thus, the steady-state private sector density is likely to be 
below its current level of 7.8%.18 
The reasons for declining unionism are many and well known.  Important, but hardly 
sufficient, are structural changes that have reallocated jobs toward industries, occupations, and 
locations that are typically less unionized.  A significant factor leading to these changes has been 
technological advances that reduce the need for labor in production jobs and in occupations 
where job tasks are routinized and programmable (e.g., elevator operators in an earlier era; travel 
agents today).19 This rapid productivity growth has been particularly evident in manufacturing, 
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2002).
19 See David H. Autor, Frank Levy & Richard J. Murname, The Skill Content of Recent Technological Change:  An 
Empirical Exploration 118 Q. J. ECON. 1279 (2003). 
7where increasing output has been accompanied by lower employment.20 Moreover, the NLRA 
organizing process has proven costly and difficult for unions, due in no small part to often fierce 
management opposition.21 Such resistance reflects, in part, an increasingly competitive domestic 
and international economy,22 coupled with union wage premiums that have shown surprisingly 
modest declines.23 
Unenthusiastic worker, public, and employer sentiment for unions in this highly-
competitive world is the ultimate constraint, limiting not only the ability to organize, but also 
adoption of union-friendly public policy and workplace norms.24 Sentiment for unions may also 
 
20 Manufacturing employment declined from approximately 20 million workers in 1977 to 15.5 million workers in 
2005; because of the growth in overall employment during that time period, manufacturing employment declined 
from 30.3% of the private sector workforce in 1977 to 14.7% in 2005.  See http://www.unionstats.com; see also 
Stone, supra note 10, at 197 (arguing that decline in manufacturing unionism has allowed employers to restructure 
work practices in ways that make organizing more difficult, such as increased use of technology). 
21 Richard B. Freeman & Joel Rogers, WHAT WORKERS WANT 62 (1999) (describing survey results showing that a 
majority of managers would oppose union organizing).  Similarly, Cynthia Estlund has argued that the NLRA’s 
isolation from any significant revisions or other forms of innovation—which she describes as its “ossification”—has 
contributed to the NLRA’s ineffectuality and the decline of unionism.  See Estlund, supra note 2, at 1530-31; see 
also Stone, supra note 10, at 125 (stating that the NLRB’s organizing rules, such as bargaining unit determinations, 
are often incompatible with the modern workplace). 
22 Indeed, Michael Wachter sees a single over-arching reason for union decline, arguing that the NLRA did not 
incorporate the corporatist outlook of the 1933 National Industrial Recovery Act (“NIRA”), which was overturned 
by the Supreme Court in its 1935 decision in Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935), and that 
over time, the competitive U.S. economy made unionism a niche workplace institution in the private sector.  See 
Wachter, A Corporatist Institution, supra 5, at 3. 
23 Wage premiums refer to the increase in wages that accompany unionization; wage premiums in the U.S. are larger 
than in most other developed countries.  See David Blanchflower & Alex Bryson, Changes Over Time in Union 
Relative Wage Effects in the UK and the US Revisited, in INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK OF LABOR UNIONS 197, 207-
18 (John T. Addison & Claus Schnabel eds., 2003) (summarizing international evidence and concluding that there 
has been only a weak downward trend in the U.S. union wage premium); see also, Barry T. Hirsch & David A. 
Macpherson, UNION MEMBERSHIP AND EARNINGS DATA BOOK: COMPILATIONS FROM THE CURRENT POPULATION 
SURVEY 19-26, Tables 2a-2c (2006) (providing time-consistent regression estimates of union wage premiums for the 
years 1973-2005). 
24 See, e.g., Darryl Fears, Union Tries To Unite Blacks, Latinos:  Workers at Meatpacking Plant Must First 
Overcome Distrust, WASH. POST, Jul. 24, 2006, at A4 (noting resistance of some workers to unionization, including 
one employee’s comment that “[a] union speaks on your behalf . . . I can speak for myself”).  Distrust of traditional 
unions is common among professional and technical workers, who often identify with management.  See Richard W. 
Hurd & John Bunge, Unionization of Professional and Technical Workers:  The Labor Market and Institutional 
Transformation, in EMERGING LABOR MARKET INSTITUTIONS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 179, 186-90 
(Richard B. Freeman, Joni Hersch, & Lawrence Mishel eds., 2005) (describing their survey of professional and 
technical workers, which revealed desire for greater voice and participation in decision making, but aversion to type 
of adversarial relationship often seen in unionized workplaces).  Worker sentiment toward organizing is also less 
favorable in geographic areas where unionization has been low in the past.  See Thomas J. Holmes, Geographic 
Spillover of Unionism (National Bureau Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 12025, 2006) (showing that unionism 
8have been dampened by government mandates and regulations that affect all workplaces; such 
legislation may act more as a substitute than a complement for collective bargaining.25 Changes 
in the interpretation and enforcement of the NLRA since the 1980s—when Republican 
administrations led to a more anti-union NLRB—have not enhanced organizing, but can explain 
little of the decline.  Private-sector union density decreased throughout the Clinton years and its 
more labor-friendly NLRB.26 
Absent a sharp and unlikely shift by workers and voters from individualistic to 
collectivist attitudes,27 or a more broad shift in U.S. economic policy from a competitive to a 
corporatist orientation,28 a resurgence in traditional private sector unionism is unlikely.  Thus, 
employees’ demand for greater workplace voice and cooperation29 will not be satisfied by 
NLRA-style collective bargaining.  This leads to questions about the NLRA’s continued 
relevance and whether other forms of employee representation and participation will develop. 
B. Managerial Discretion or Contractual Governance:  Which Works Best? 
How relevant is the NLRA for workers in the current U.S. labor market?  Apart from its 
role in governing the union organizational and electoral process, the NLRA’s role in nonunion 
 
is “contagious,” spilling out of long-ago unionized coal mines and steel mills into newly established supermarkets 
and hospitals), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w12025. 
25 See George R. Neumann & Ellen Rissman, Where Have All the Union Members Gone? 2 J. LAB. ECON. 175 
(1984) (estimating frequently espoused, but rarely tested, thesis that governmental protections for workers have led 
to lower union density, and finding time-series and cross-section evidence consistent with thesis). 
26 See http://www.unionstats.com (Section I). 
27 Richard B. Freeman, Spurts in Union Growth: Defining Moments and Social Processes, in THE DEFINING 
MOMENT: THE GREAT DEPRESSION AND THE AMERICAN ECONOMY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 265, 278-87 
(Michael D. Bordo, Claudia Goldin & Eugene N. White eds., 1998) (arguing that increases in union density have 
occurred in spurts following shifts in worker and public attitudes toward collective action). 
28 “Corporatist” governance emphasizes cooperation among groups and cooperation between the state and certain 
powerful groups, such as national unions.  See Wachter, A Corporatist Institution, supra note 5, at 6.  In the labor 
context, corporatism “views free competition as a destructive force that has to be both controlled and channeled 
through institutions that practice fair—but not free—competition under the watchful, mediating power of the 
government.”  Id. at 1.  Corporatist policymaking, therefore, seeks “fair union wages” and “responds to institutional 
actors such as unions and corporations rather than to individuals.”  Id. 
29 See infra notes 56-61 and accompanying text. 
9workplaces, which cover over 90% of private sector employment, is modest.30 Even for firms 
that could face union organizing campaigns, the NLRA’s relevance has waned, as today’s 
workplaces no longer match the work environment envisioned by the Act’s architects.   
Implicit in the NLRA is a hierarchal view of management, in which workplaces have top-
down control moving from managers to workers who have minimal discretion or decision-
making authority.  This characterization may have been defensible during the NLRA’s formative 
years, but not today.  Traditional union governance regularizes and codifies worker tasks within 
a top-down command structure.  In contrast, modern workplaces typically require interaction and 
two-way communications between workers and supervisors, accompanied by the use of bottom-
up worker and managerial discretion that takes advantage of site-specific information.31 In 
contemporary workplaces, job hierarchies are often not clear-cut and worker decision-making is 
essential at most levels.32 
In addition, the current dominant governance structure in the private sector is not 
traditional unionization, but employer-fiat personnel systems in which outcomes are determined 
by some combination of employer norms, governmental regulation, and the incentives and 
constraints produced by market forces.  The principal market constraints derive from competition 
in capital and labor markets.  For the firm to survive over the long run, it must earn a competitive 
return on capital, preventing an employer from paying its workers a wage in excess—or, at least, 
well in excess—of the value they generate for the firm.  In order to attract and retain capable 
 
30 The NLRA does apply to nonunion workforces in numerous circumstances, although employees’ knowledge of 
the statute’s relevance is uncertain.  Most obviously, the NLRA governs the organizational and electoral process 
before a union becomes the bargaining representative.  See 29 U.S.C. § 159.  The NLRA also protects a wide variety 
of concerted activity, even where there is no union on the scene (e.g., safety complaints and pushes for higher 
wages).  See id. § 158(a)(1); infra notes 196-201 and accompanying text.  Moreover, as discussed in detail below, 
Section 8(a)(2) regulates nonunion employers’ ability to create or support groups that involve discussions with 
employees over terms and conditions of employment.  See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2); infra Section III.A. 
31 “Site-specific information” refers to information targeted to a particular work location, product, process, or time. 
32 See supra notes 10-11; Samuel Estreicher, Employee Involvement and the “Company Union” Prohibition:  The 
Case for Partial Repeal of Section 8(a)(2) of the NLRA, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 125, 135-39 (1994).  
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employees, however, workers must expect to receive compensation similar to, or in excess of, 
what they could receive in alternative employment opportunities.  Subject to these economic 
constraints—as well as governmental limits on actions involving discrimination, minimum pay, 
hours of work, safety, and the like33—nonunion employers are free to dictate wages and 
workplace governance methods.  If a wage and governance regime is costly relative to the value 
of output, the employer will suffer losses.  If wages are too low or the work environment too 
harsh, the firm cannot attract and retain sufficient numbers of workers to operate and survive.  
For enterprises operating between these upper and lower bounds, nonunion employer fiat has 
proven to be a more dominant governance structure than collective bargaining contracts. 
Michael Wachter identifies several factors in labor-contracting relationships that are 
critical for all firms, union and nonunion, and that help to explain the current dominance of 
nonunion governance structures.34 Wachter argues that the predominance of nonunion firms is 
primarily the result of low transaction costs, coupled with nonunion firms’ ability to deal 
effectively with match-specific investments, asymmetric information, and risk bearing.  
Although unionized firms can handle these latter three factors through formal contracting, 
nonunion companies manage these factors without the use of explicit contracts, sometimes more 
and sometimes less effectively than if they were unionized.  More significant is the disadvantage 
that union companies face due to high transaction costs. 
Match-specific investments refer to the time and money necessary to create and maintain 
 
33 See, e.g., Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678; Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17; Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219. 
34 See Michael L. Wachter, Theories of the Employment Relationship:  Choosing Between Norms and Contracts, in 
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON WORK AND THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP 163, 176 (Bruce E. Kaufman ed., 
2004).  Alan Hyde has identified similar market failures—such as inelasticity of supply, collective action problems, 
low trust and opportunism, and information asymmetry—that he argues provide justification for labor regulation.  
See Alan Hyde, What is Labor Law?, in BOUNDARIES AND FRONTIERS OF LABOUR LAWS: GOALS AND MEANS IN 
THE REGULATION OF WORK (Guy Davidov & Brian Langille eds., forthcoming 2006), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=896381. 
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a work relationship.  These investments result in workers becoming more valuable to their 
current employer (relative to other employers) as the worker gains job-specific skills and the 
parties become adept at dealing with each other.35 A problem associated with match-specific 
investments is the possibility of hold-up; once a party makes such investments, the other party 
can behave opportunistically and capture ex post quasi-rents.36 One solution is for workers and 
firms to jointly invest in firm-specific skills that create self-enforcing agreements that give both 
parties an interest in continuing the relationship rather than losing their investment.37 
Opportunistic behavior by nonunion employers is also constrained by concern for their 
reputation among potential workers.38 
Asymmetric information involves differences in the ability of the parties to monitor 
certain aspects of the job or firm, creating a risk that the advantaged party will behave 
opportunistically.39 For example, firms possess information on product demand superior to that 
of workers, thereby providing firms the opportunity to misstate market conditions to gain an 
advantage in workplace negotiations.40 A result of the product-demand asymmetry has been the 
widespread norm under which firms rarely adjust wages downward, but are relatively free to 
 
35 Id. at 167. 
36 Id. at 168.  In other words, as workers gain more job-specific—that is, “match-investment”—skills and 
connections, their value to the firm becomes higher than their value in the external labor market.  Id.  This difference 
between a worker’s value to the firm and value to the outside labor market is a “quasi-rent” that a party may be able 
to capture by, for example, threatening to end the work relationship unless they receive a larger share of profits.  Id.  
As Wachter notes, match-specific investments generally benefit both employers and employees; thus, the parties, 
and society, would be better off if parties could make match-specific investments without the risk of the other party 
attempting to capture any rents that result after the initial investments are made.  Id. 
37 Id. at 168. 
38 See Wachter, supra note 34, at 176, 181-82.  Not so easily solved is the hold-up problem faced by union firms 
with respect to firm-specific capital investments.  Once fixed capital is in place, unions can capture—or “tax”—
some share of the normal returns to investment.  Knowing this, unionized firms will invest less, requiring a higher 
“before-tax” return.  See Paul A. Grout, Investment and Wages in the Absence of Binding Contracts:  A Nash 
Bargaining Approach, 52 ECONOMETRICA 449 (1984) (providing theory); see also Barry T. Hirsch, What Do Unions 
Do For Economic Performance?, 25 J. LAB. RES. 415,  434-36 (2004) [hereinafter Hirsch, Economic Performance]
(evaluating empirical literature for U.S., which generally finds lower investment in physical capital, and research 
and development, among union firms). 
39 See Wachter, supra note 34, at 168. 
40 Id. 
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adjust employment levels.41 This self-enforcing mechanism helps to diminish opportunistic use 
of the information asymmetry by eliminating the incentive to understate the true level of demand 
in order to justify a decrease in wages.42 Employers lack incentive to misstate demand with 
regard to employment levels because they do not want to cut employment if demand is strong.43 
In unionized workplaces, a similar but more formal arrangement exists, where most collective-
bargaining agreements allow employment level, but not wage, adjustments absent negotiation.  
Unions may grant employer requests for wage concessions, but generally only if financial 
records are disclosed to union representatives.44 
Risk bearing is another major problem in the employment relationship.  Because most 
workers have incomes tied to their jobs, they are in a poor position to bear company-specific 
earnings risk that could result in fewer hours, lower wages and benefits, or job loss.45 Investors, 
in contrast, can readily diversify investments and bear such risk.  This difference in the ability to 
tolerate risk may cause problems, as workers’ compensation and wealth are tied to factors out of 
their control.  More efficient risk bearing would insulate workers’ compensation from variances 
in firm revenue and profit.46 Consequently, both union and nonunion workplaces tend to have 
relatively fixed wage rates.47 In union companies, such rates are usually required under a 
collective bargaining agreement, and in nonunion companies there is a largely self-enforcing 
 
41 Id. at 168-69; see also Truman F. Bewley, WHY WAGES DON’T FALL DURING A RECESSION (1999) (providing 
comprehensive theoretical and empirical treatment of why wages are rigid downward). 
42 Id. at 169. 
43 See Wachter, supra note 34, at 169. 
44 See NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149, 152-53 (1956) (holding that an employer that claims an inability to 
provide wage increases must disclose financial information to support claim).  Later decisions have limited 
employers’ disclosure obligation to instances where it explicitly states that it cannot afford a union demand.  See 
Graphic Commc’ns Int’l Union, Local 508 v. NLRB, 977 F.2d 1168, 1170-71 (7th Cir. 1992). 
45 See Wachter, supra note 34, at 169; Jeffrey M. Hirsch, Labor Law Obstacles to the Collective Negotiation and 
Implementation of Employee Stock Ownership Plans:  A Response to Henry Hansmann and Other “Survivalists”, 63 
FORDHAM L. REV. 957, 977-78 (1998) [hereinafter Hirsch, Labor Law Obstacles]. 
46 Id. at 169. 
47 The term “fixed wage rates” refers here to time-based pay (e.g., an hourly wage or annual salary) that does not 
vary with respect to temporary fluctuation in firm revenues and costs.  
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implicit contract or norm of fixed wages, with employer reputation playing a key enforcement 
role. 
The principal advantage of nonunion pay and governance determination over union 
agreements is not from the above factors, but rather from transaction costs.48 Because new 
information is constantly coming to a firm and its workers, it is prohibitively costly to have 
explicit contract terms for every possible contingency.  Although many collective bargaining 
agreements have broad management rights clauses,49 a unionized company’s formalized 
contractual governance structure limits management’s and workers’ flexibility and discretion.  
Revising contractual terms via the collective bargaining process is difficult and costly.50 By the 
same token, the inability to revise the employer-employee relationship in response to external 
market changes is also costly, all the more so in today’s rapidly changing and highly competitive 
economic environment. 
Ultimately, the workplace choice between informal nonunion governance—that is, 
employer fiat—and formal union governance should depend on the answers to two questions.  
First, does management discretion or union governance better handle the contractual problems 
found in all workplaces—match specific-specific investments, asymmetric information, risk, and 
transaction costs?  For example, if management can behave opportunistically and appropriate 
quasi-rents from immobile workers with little loss in firm reputation or worker productivity, then 
a formalized union contractual relationship becomes attractive.  To the extent that unions can and 
 
48 As Wachter notes, transaction costs are exacerbated in the face of more match-specific investments and 
information asymmetries, as the need to regulate a higher potential for opportunistic behavior is more costly.  See 
Wachter, supra note 34, at 170. 
49 See, e.g., St. George’s Warehouse, Inc., 341 N.L.R.B. 904, 907, 927 (2004) (finding employer’s proposal for 
broad management rights clause—which would allow it complete discretion over hiring; promotions; discipline for 
cause; demotions; transfers; layoffs; recalls; setting productivity standards; contracting with third-parties to supply 
personnel; closing, expanding, or relocating its facility; ceasing any job; and changing methods of operation—to be 
lawful).  
50 See Wachter, supra note 34, at 170. 
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do behave opportunistically by appropriating quasi-rents from shareholders to acquire wage 
premiums, then the union form becomes less attractive.  The second question is how competitive 
and dynamic are product and resource markets?  Where changes in technology, product markets, 
and financial markets are rapid, the costs of inflexibility in a formalized environment are more 
severe.  In such an environment, the greater discretion and flexibility associated with nonunion 
governance are distinct advantages. 
We contend that sectoral and technological changes, coupled with rising competition in 
the U.S. and world economies,51 increasingly tilt labor-contracting preferences toward nonunion 
governance.  Outside of today’s formalized union sector, most workers are employed in firms 
where workplace governance is subject to substantial management discretion.  That discretion is 
influenced by societal norms and constrained by governmental regulations.  At least as 
important, competition for employees requires that companies provide sufficient compensation 
and acquire a reputation that will enable them to attract, motivate, and maintain a productive 
work force.52 
In today’s economy, union governance has proven to be an expensive minority model.  
The disadvantage of traditional unionism is most apparent in the effect of unions on profitability, 
investment, growth, and other aspects of firm performance, where improvements in productivity 
fail to offset the costs of union wage premiums.53 Any profitability gap between union and 
nonunion firms is sure to fuel and maintain strong management opposition to union organizing.54 
As long as there is a gap in firm performance, managerial discretion will remain the dominant 
 
51 See supra notes 10-11, 20-23. 
52 See supra note 34. 
53 See Hirsch, Economic Performance, supra note 38, at 431-34. 
54 There is some circularity here.  No doubt much of management opposition to unions is the result of higher per unit 
costs and less management discretion.  But a hostile attitude by management toward unions also makes it less likely 
one will see an enhancement in performance owing to cooperation and collective voice within union companies. 
15
form of workplace governance. 
The dominance of managerial discretion over contractual governance suggests that the 
future labor relations environment will look much like it does today, with no resurgence of 
unionization on the horizon—at least traditional unions in the style envisaged by the NLRA.  In 
the following section, we identify alternative paths that might lead to workplace gains in a world 
in which traditional collective governance continues to lose relevance.  The NLRA, however, 
still retains some significance, for both better and worse.  Under the alternatives proposed here, 
the Act could enjoy increased relevance by fostering a new model of collective action that makes 
society better off. 
II. UNFULFILLED DESIRES OF PRIVATE SECTOR EMPLOYEES 
A. What Workers Want 
The purpose of this Article is to outline alternative paths that, although not politically 
likely, could lead to workplace gains in a world where private sector unionism remains limited.  
To assess what gains may be possible, we begin by asking what workers want.  Labor reforms 
should address the concerns of workers, while taking into account their impact on employers and 
the economy, such as investment and job creation.  Worker concerns, at least to the extent they 
touch on collective action, are expressly protected by the NLRA.55 
In the early 1990s, the Commission on the Future of Worker-Management Relations 
(commonly known as the “Dunlop Commission”) administered the Worker Representation and 
Participation Survey.  The results of this survey, along with similar surveys in other countries, 
are comprehensively analyzed by Richard Freeman and Joel Rogers in What Workers Want.56 
55 See supra notes 6-9 and accompanying text. 
56 Freeman & Rogers, supra note 21; see also Bruce E. Kaufman, The Employee Participation and Representation 
Gap: An Assessment and Proposed Solution, 3 PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 491 (2001) (challenging conclusions drawn by 
Freeman and Rogers from the worker survey). 
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The survey results paint a picture of significant unmet employee desires.  First, many workers 
want greater voice and participation in workplace decision-making, although they seek 
individual voice as much as the collective right to be heard associated with traditional unions.57 
Second, workers want a more cooperative and less adversarial worker-management relationship, 
coupled with managerial support for entities that foster worker participation.58 Third, workers 
want not just to express themselves, but also to have their views affect workplace outcomes in 
meaningful ways.59 And fourth, workers see management resistance as the primary obstacle to 
worker participation and cooperation.60 Despite some differences, the expressed desires and 
concerns of workers are similar in union and nonunion workplaces.61 
We draw several inferences from these results.  One conclusion is that the current system 
often leads to an underproduction of worker voice and participation, as well as worker-
management cooperation, in both union and nonunion workplaces.62 Moreover, the adversarial 
relationship envisioned and reinforced by the NLRA does not appeal to workers.  Finally, greater 
voice and cooperation are unlikely to evolve from the current status quo.  These inferences open 
the door for potential societal gains through welfare-enhancing regulatory reforms.63 
We identify four criteria by which labor regulation reforms should be evaluated, while 
 
57 Freeman & Rogers, supra note 21, at 4-5, 147.  Approximately 50 million employees (union and nonunion) 
wanted more voice at work, while nearly one-third (15 million) of nonunion employees of all but the smallest 
private sector firms wanted union representation and over 90% of unionized employees wanted to keep their union 
representation.  See Paul C. Weiler, A Principled Reshaping of Labor Law for the Twenty-First Century, 3 U. PA. J. 
LAB. & EMP. L. 177, 187, 197 (2001) [hereinafter, Weiler, A Principled Reshaping] (citing the Worker 
Representation and Participation Survey). 
58 Freeman & Rogers, supra note 21, at 5, 59, 141-42. 
59 Id. at 4-5, 40-42.  Freeman and Rogers note that the biggest gap in the amount of influence that employees want, 
versus what they actually have, involves issues of benefits and pay, followed by training and, to a much smaller 
degree, determining how and when to perform work.  Id. at 51. 
60 Id. at 5, 87.  See Weiler, A Principled Reshaping, supra note 57, at 178 (2001) (noting that 79% of nonunion 
employees said that employees visibly seeking unionization would very likely lose their jobs and 41% said that they 
would personally lose their job if there were identified as being involved in a union campaign). 
61 Freeman & Rogers, supra note 21, at 52. 
62 See Lawrence H. Summers, Some Simple Economics of Mandated Benefits, 79 AM. ECON. REV. 177 (1989) 
(comparing efficiency of labor regulations versus unregulated market outcomes). 
63 See infra Section III. 
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recognizing that tradeoffs among the criteria may exist.64 First, proposals should be welfare-
enhancing for the parties and the economy.65 Second, reforms should facilitate enhanced voice 
(including some freedom to choose whether and how to exercise that voice), encourage 
cooperation and discourage costly conflict, and increase the flow of information within nonunion 
workplaces.  Third, any arrangement should constrain rent-seeking and opportunistic behavior by 
workers and employers.  Fourth, reforms should allow for variation across heterogeneous 
workplaces and be flexible over time. 
There are several paths that might encourage welfare-enhancing workplace governance.  
We focus on nonunion workplaces, although what happens in the nonunion sector will affect 
outcomes in the union sector.  By “nonunion,” however, we include ventures sponsored by 
unions that do not follow the traditional union form.  Indeed, we anticipate that unions will be an 
important catalyst for new workplace governance structures, with such innovations taking on an 
increasingly significant role as long as union density remains low.  Accordingly, we propose 
alternatives that reduce legal impediments to nontraditional forms of workplace governance, with 
the hope that these labor law and employment regulation reforms can provide at least modest 
social welfare gains.  Before discussing these alternatives, however, we identify some recent 
workplace governance innovations that may establish the foundation for the future of private 
sector collective action. 
 
64 For example, under certain circumstances, increasing worker voice while limiting rent-seeking behavior among 
workers may be mutually exclusive. 
65 Welfare-enhancing reform is defined at supra notes 4 and accompanying text. The value to the parties of an  
“enterprise” can be defined as the sum of shareholder profits plus worker rents (the excess of compensation over 
opportunity costs).  See John M. Abowd, The Effect of Wage Bargains on the Stock Market Value of the Firm, 79 
AM. ECON. REV. 774, 777 (1989) (developing and applying this definition of an enterprise). 
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B. What Workers Get 
The vast majority of private sector workers will never have an opportunity to engage in 
collective voice and participation via traditional unionism.66 Yet, despite legal hurdles to 
nontraditional workplace governance schemes,67 the use of innovative work groups68 is 
developing rapidly.  No doubt due to their recent lack of success at gaining members,69 
traditional unions have been at the forefront of developing new and different ways to reach and 
serve the interests of workers.  Whether these innovations are intended solely to boost traditional 
union membership, or are merely a reflection of unions’ concern for workers, they represent 
potentially vital tools for providing real voice and participation to nonunion private sector 
employees.  Although the use of welfare-enhancing work groups is growing, they face legal 
obstacles and reach only a small percentage of private-sector employees; thus, labor reforms 
should seek to further encourage their development. 
Unions increasingly seek to organize workers outside the typical NLRA election 
process.70 One popular technique is to organize workers around issues other than those directly 
implicating workplace concerns.  The Service Employees International Union (“SEIU”), for 
example, successfully organized janitors in Santa Clara County, California despite significant 
 
66 See supra Section I.A. 
67 See infra Sections III.A, III.E. 
68 We refer to “work groups” broadly as any entity in which employees participate and that serves some interest of 
employees.  This use is similar to the “employee involvement” programs that Freeman and Rogers define as 
including such disparate entities as quality circles, discussion groups, total quality management groups, self-directed 
work teams, safety committees, production committees, holiday part committees, and other small groups that work 
on certain issues.  See Freeman & Rogers, supra note 21, at 101. 
69 See supra notes 14-17 and accompanying text. 
70 For example, unions have increasingly sought to avoid the Board’s election process by convincing employers, and 
pressing for legislation that would require employers, to bargain with unions that have been selected by a majority of 
employees who signed cards in support of the union.  See Employee Free Choice Act, S. 842; H.R. 1696.  The bill 
would require employers to recognize a union that obtains majority support from employees via a “card-check” 
(cards signed by employees stating that they want the union to represent them).  Surprisingly, a majority of House 
members—in a Republican-majority House—have already signed on to the bill as co-sponsors.  See Majority of 
House Likely To Co-Sponsor ‘Card Check’ Bill, AFL-CIO Official Says, 89 DAILY LABOR REPORT (BNA), May 9, 
2006, at A-6.  
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hurdles that included the mostly Mexican immigrant workers’ low English language and job 
skills.71 The SEIU’s success was based in large part on a campaign centered on Mexican culture 
that involved religious and political leaders, and used publicity techniques that included 
demonstrations and boycotts against the high-tech companies such as Apple Computer that hired 
the cleaning contractors employing the janitors.72 As union density levels remain low, unions are 
likely to increase their use of such innovative strategies.  Indeed, the 2005 split in the AFL-CIO 
was prompted by the belief of the SEIU and other major unions joining the Change To Win 
Coalition that the AFL-CIO’s organizing efforts were too conservative.73 Attempts at innovative 
organizing have also led to the formation of work groups that do not act as traditional unions, but 
provide an opportunity for voice that many workers want. 
These nontraditional work groups include a growing trend by unions forming affiliate 
organizations that do not deal with employers on behalf of their members.  For example, the 
AFL-CIO’s “Working America” affiliate consists of members who are associated with labor 
generally, but are not formally represented by a union.74 Its main purpose has been to encourage 
 
71 See Stone, supra note 10, at 225 (describing Justice for Janitors campaign and other nontraditional union 
organizations); Alan Hyde, Employee Organization in Silicon Valley:  Networks, Ethnic Organization, and New 
Unions, 4 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 493, 497 (2002) [hereinafter Hyde, Employee Organization]. 
72 See Christopher L. Erickson, Catherine Fisk, Ruth Milkman, Daniel J.B. Mitchell & Kent Wong, Justice for 
Janitors in Los Angeles and Beyond:  A New Form of Unionism in the Twenty-first Century?, in THE CHANGING 
ROLE OF UNIONS: NEW FORMS OF REPRESENTATION 22 (Phanindra V. Wunnava ed., 2004) (examining reasons for 
success of justice for janitors campaign and asking whether a similar approach would succeed more generally); 
Hyde, Employee Organization, supra note 71, at 497; see also Estlund, supra note 2, at 1604-06 (describing 
“corporate campaigns,” by which unions publicize dispute to employer’s customers); Mark Barenberg, Democracy 
and Domination in the Law of Workplace Cooperation:  From Bureaucratic to Flexible Production, 94 COLUM. L. 
REV. 753, 951-54 (1994) [hereinafter Barenberg, Democracy and Domination] (discussing historical examples of 
joint union-management councils). 
73 See Michelle Amber, SEIU, IBT Disaffiliate From AFL-CIO, Announce Plan to Set Up New Federation, 142 
DAILY LABOR REPORT (BNA), July 26, 2006, at AA-1. 
74 See Richard B. Freeman, From the Webbs to the Web:  The Contribution of the Internet to Reviving Union 
Fortunes 17 (National Bureau Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11298, 2005), available at 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w11298; Alan Hyde, New Institutions for Worker Representation in the United States:  
Some Theoretical Issues, 50 N.Y.L.S. L. REV. 501, 505 (2005-2006) [hereinafter Hyde, New Institutions].  The AFL-
CIO also initiated an associate member program that allowed nonunion or unemployed workers to pay reduced dues 
and enjoy certain privileges of union membership.  See Stone, supra note 10, at 218 (noting that primary goal was to 
support possible future organizing efforts). 
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action on local and national political issues; yet, its potential to activate members for other 
projects is significant.75 For example, Working America recently created a web site that contains 
a database with information on over 60,000 companies, including executive compensation, 
overseas outsourcing, and labor and employment violations.76 This type of information may be 
valuable to workers, arguably reducing information asymmetries and, in some cases, the 
employer opportunistic behavior such asymmetries allow.77 
Another interesting example of the increasingly blurry line between traditional unionism 
and less formal work groups is the alliance between the AFL-CIO and the National Day Laborer 
Organizing Network (“NDLON”).  In announcing their alliance, the groups expressed their intent 
to form a National Worker Center Partnership, which would further support community-based 
entities called “worker centers” that act as advocates for nonunion workers and provide a large 
range of services to enhance both collective and individual voice.78 Worker centers already have 
a significant presence in the U.S., with over 140 centers in 31 states.79 
These new work groups aptly show how employee voice can be satisfied through 
alternative institutions and that such institutions can be transformed and evolve over time.  The 
Communication Workers of America’s (“CWA”) “WashTech” affiliate, for instance, 
transformed from a nonbargaining entity to one that sought formal bargaining status and 
ultimately led to the creation of several entirely different work groups.  The CWA initially 
formed WashTech only to assist, and lobby on behalf of, Microsoft independent contractors and 
 
75 See Freeman, Web, supra note 74, at 19; Hyde, New Institutions, supra note 74, at 505. 
76 See Amy Joyce, Labor Web Site Keeps Tabs on Business:  Workers Can Check Executive Salaries, Company 
Violations, WASH. POST, Nov. 18, 2005, at D3 (noting also similar actions by two groups that monitor Wal-Mart’s 
conduct).  The Working America database is available at:  http://www.workingamerica.org/jobtracker. 
77 See supra notes 39-44 and accompanying text. 
78 See Michelle Amber, AFL, Day Laborers Group, Sign Pact To Advance Workers, Immigration Rights, 154 DAILY 
LABOR REPORT (BNA), August 10, 2006, at A-4 (noting that some worker centers may also provide legal services). 
79 See id.  NDLON already operates the largest association of worker centers, with more than 40 centers focused on 
issues affecting day laborers.  Id. Twenty-five other day labor centers operated by 28 other groups exist as well.  Id. 
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temporary help agency workers, but it has begun to seek recognition on behalf of some 
technology workers—and even obtained card check recognition from one employer.80 
Washtech’s success prompted the CWA to form a national website for all technology workers, 
and other unions have followed suit.81 
The examples above illustrate the possibility of providing services to workers through 
innovative organizations not directly tied to the workplace—that is, outside the traditional 
collective bargaining process.  Although these groups have potential, they will not necessarily 
flourish or become widespread.  Such efforts are costly both in the initial and ongoing stages, 
and the union and philanthropic foundation funds needed to support these groups are limited.  
Monies will flow to these organizations only if they provide benefits greater than alternative uses 
of scarce funds. 
More fundamentally, as pointed out by Joni Hersch, there is a basic tension in such 
organizations that may limit their development.82 Hersch asks whether a large interest group not 
attached to the workplace can successfully provide services to workers and lobby for their well-
being.  Hersch examines in some detail the experience of Working Today, which began as a 
group broadly focused on services and lobbying for independent workers, but evolved into a 
group claiming an overriding social agenda, while focusing more narrowly on making benefits 
portable across jobs.83 Generalizing from this analysis, Hersch models a group that provides 
services, lobbies, and represents members.  Tension arises because the organization provides a 
good that is partly public—that is, its benefits spill over to nonmembers.  It must attract members 
 
80 See Stone, supra note 10, at 235; Hyde, New Institutions, supra note 74, at 506; see also id. at 507-09 (discussing 
other examples of membership-based “alternative worker organizations”). 
81 See Freeman, Web, supra note 74, at 18-20 (describing International Association of Machinist’s “Cyberlodge,” 
Steelworkers union’s open membership plan, and SEIU’s “Purple Ocean”). 
82 See Joni Hersch, A Workers’ Lobby to Provide Portable Benefits, in EMERGING LABOR MARKET INSTITUTIONS 
FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 207 (Richard B. Freeman, Joni Hersch, & Lawrence Mishel eds., 2005). 
83 Id. at 213-15. 
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based on the private goods it provides, while raising money from foundations or large entities 
interested in the public outcome.84 The implication drawn by Hersch is that there is no common 
blueprint for such an organization—different types of groups can and will arise.  But their 
success and growth is not guaranteed. 
As described in more detail below,85 work groups can provide a diverse set of services for 
workers and satisfy to some degree the desire for workplace voice and participation.  The NLRA, 
however, has not been hospitable to these nontraditional work groups, effectively reducing the 
choice set for most workers to either traditional unions or management discretion (albeit 
constrained), with little in between.86 What follows, therefore, are proposals to make the NLRA 
more open to welfare-enhancing innovations that facilitate worker voice, participation, and 
cooperation in the workplace, in particular for private sector nonunion workers. 
III. ENCOURAGING WORKER VOICE AND PARTICIPATION IN NONUNION WORKPLACES 
A. Reforming the NLRA’s “Company Union” Prohibition 
Any discussion of expanding the development of nontraditional work groups must focus 
on the NLRA’s broad “company union” prohibition.  This prohibition, as currently interpreted by 
the NLRB, severely limits employers’ ability to lawfully establish work groups that may provide 
welfare-enhancing employee voice and participation.  Accordingly, we propose a legislative 
modification that would significantly reduce the number and types of groups that fall under the 
 
84 Id. at 216-18. 
85 See infra notes 106-111 and accompanying text. 
86 Alex Bryson and Richard Freeman find that underlying preferences among workers are roughly similar in the U.S. 
and UK, but that workplace outcomes differ because the UK provides a greater range of institutional options than 
does the U.S.  The authors conclude:   
The different choices on offer in the two countries appear to affect the different responses of UK and US 
workers to fairly similar workplace needs/problems.  The dichotomous choice between collective 
bargaining and no representation in the US produces a smaller rate of unionization in the US that 
manifests itself in greater unfilled demand for unions among non-union workers than in the UK; whereas 
the wider choice of voice institutions in the UK attracts many to take the free rider option. 
Alex Bryson & Richard B. Freeman, Worker Needs and Voice in the US and the UK 22 (National Bureau Econ. 
Research, Working Paper No. 12310, 2006), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w12310. 
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company union ban. 
In its attempt to prevent employer-controlled unions via Section 8(a)(2) and, by inclusion, 
Section 2(5),87 the NLRA also limits less formal employer-sponsored work groups—even those 
that do not bargain on behalf of employees.  Section 8(a)(2) prohibits employer domination or 
support for any labor organization.88 Section 2(5) defines a “labor organization” as any entity in 
which employees participate and which has a purpose to deal with employers over grievances, 
disputes, wages, pay rates, hours of employment, or work conditions.89 
The legitimate goals underlying Section 8(a)(2)’s inclusion in the 1935 Wagner Act 
include an attempt to prevent employer-dominated work groups that would interfere with 
employees’ freedom to choose an independent, traditional union and to bar representation that, 
because of ties to employers, was viewed as inherently flawed.90 The fear that employers may 
create entities that interfere with employees’ choice whether or not to seek collective 
representation led to Section 2(5)’s broad definition of “labor organization,” which the Board 
subsequently expanded further.91 
The Board has concluded that it will classify an entity as a labor organization under 
 
87 29 U.S.C. §§ 152(5), 158(a)(2).  
88 Id. § 158(a)(2) (making it an unfair labor practice for an employer “to dominate or interfere with the formation or 
administration of any labor organization”). 
89 Id. § 152(5) (defining “labor organization” as “any organization of any kind, or any agency or employee 
representation committee or plan, in which employees participate and which exists for the purpose, in whole or in 
part, or dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or 
conditions of work”). 
90 See Electromation, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. 990, 992-94 (1992), enforced, 35 F.3d 1148 (7th Cir. 1994); LeRoy, supra 
note 11, at 1661 (noting that many early twentieth century employee participation groups were progressive, but 
other employers created such groups in anticipation of federal labor legislation and in hopes of barring independent 
unions from the workplace); Estreicher, supra note 32, at 130-32 (describing “employer coercion” and “false 
consciousness” rationales); Alan Hyde, Employee Caucus:  A Key Institution in the Emerging System of Employment 
Law, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 149, 174-76 (1993) (discussing possible rationales of Section 8(a)(2)).  An excellent 
volume edited by Bruce Kaufman and Daphne Gottlieb Taras includes several papers examining company supported 
worker groups in the U.S. and in Canada.  See NONUNION EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION: HISTORY, CONTEMPORARY 
PRACTICE, AND POLICY (Bruce E. Kaufman & Daphne Gottlieb Taras eds., 2000). 
91 See Barenberg, Political Economy, supra note 7, at 1459 (citing, as examples, NLRB v. Pa. Greyhound Lines, 303 
U.S. 261, 268-69 (1938); Int’l Harvester Co., 2 N.L.R.B. 310, 354 (1936); Wheeling Steel Corp., 1 N.L.R.B. 699, 
710 (1936)). 
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Section 2(5) if “1) employees participate, 2) the organization exists, at least in part, for the 
purpose of ‘dealing with’ employers, and 3) these dealings concern ‘conditions of work’ or 
concern other statutory subjects [listed in Section 2(5)], such as grievances, labor disputes, 
wages, rates of pay, or hours of employment.”92 The current expansive reach of Section 2(5), 
and by extension Section 8(a)(2), results in large part from the Board’s interpretation of “dealing 
with.”  According to the Board, an entity is “dealing with” an employer wherever there is a 
“bilateral mechanism involving proposals from [an] employee committee concerning the subjects 
listed in Sec[tion] 2(5), coupled with real or apparent consideration of those proposals by 
management.”93 In particular, “dealing” is present if there is a “pattern or practice in which a 
group of employees, over time, makes proposals to management, management responds to these 
proposals by acceptance or rejection by word or deed, and compromise is not required.”94 The 
Board has broadly interpreted this definition to cover entities with no formal structure, even if 
they have no elected officers, by-laws, regular meetings, or dues and do not engage in anything 
close to collective bargaining.95 Any employer support or control over such an organization—
for instance, creating the group or running its meetings—violates Section 8(a)(2).96 
The expansiveness of these provisions restricts development of nonunion vehicles for 
 
92 Electromation, 309 N.L.R.B. at 994. 
93 Id. at 995 n.21 (stating also that “[a] unilateral mechanism, such as a ‘suggestion box,’ or ‘brainstorming’ groups 
or meetings, or analogous information exchanges, does not constitute ‘dealing with’”).  Since the Supreme Court’s 
1959 decision in Cabot Carbon, “dealing with” has been interpreted broader than “collective bargaining.”  NLRB v. 
Cabot Carbon Co., 360 U.S. 203 (1959).  Electromation also suggested, but ultimately did not decide, that a labor 
organization must serve in some sort of representational capacity.  See 309 N.L.R.B. at 944 n.20.  The Board’s 
interpretation of Section 2(5)’s scope came in part as a reaction to some courts’ more narrow interpretation of “labor 
organization.”  See id. at 996 (rejecting NLRB v. Streamway Div. of Scott & Fetzer Co., 691 F.2d 288 (6th Cir. 
1982) (requiring employees to believe that an entity is a union to constitute a “labor organization” under Section 
2(5)). 
94 E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 311 N.L.R.B. 893, 894 (1993). 
95 See Electromation, 309 N.L.R.B. at 993-94 (concluding that legislative history of Section 8(a)(2) required a broad 
interpretation of “labor organization” in order to ban “employee representation committees,” which had little formal 
structure); Estreicher, supra note 32, at 126 (1994) (citing Cabot Carbon). 
96 E. I. Du Pont, 311 N.L.R.B. at 896; Electromation, 309 N.L.R.B. at 995. 
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employer-employee cooperation and productivity-enhancing worker voice.97 This is because the 
NLRA allows no middle ground—employees often must choose between traditional union 
representation or no representation at all.98 
One of many illustrations of the vast reach of the company union prohibition is the 
Board’s decision in Grouse Mountain Lodge.99 The employer in that case operated a Montana 
resort that was facing an organizing campaign.100 Among several unfair labor practices 
occurring during the campaign, the Board found that the employer violated Section 8(a)(2) 
because of its support for the “Quality Assurance (QA) Committee.”101 The QA Committee 
consisted of a suggestion box and various meetings; all employees were invited to the meetings, 
where they could offer ideas to management and discuss issues such as work conditions, guest 
matters, and safety concerns.102 Although the QA Committee had no structural documents, by-
laws, or procedures,103 the Board found that it was a labor organization.  According to the Board, 
the QA Committee satisfied the “dealing with” requirement, in part, because the employer 
sought input from the committee about what should be served for employees’ free lunches and 
which holiday they should designate as the new day providing overtime pay.104 It is difficult to 
imagine how this type of employer-employee interaction interferes with employees’ labor rights.  
Rather, this type of virtually structureless feedback is often indispensable to companies in the 
modern economy.  Yet, the Board’s current company union jurisprudence unjustifiably treats 
 
97 See Estlund, supra note 2, at 1545-46 (discussing different approaches that Congress may have taken in 1935). 
98 See id. at 1546. 
99 333 N.L.R.B. 1322 (2001), enforced, 56 F. App’x 811 (9th Cir. 2003). 
100 Id. at 1328. 
101 Id. at 1335-37. 
102 Id. at 1335. 
103 Id. 
104 Id. at 1336 (concluding that suggestions and ideas initially raised by individual employees are “debated amongst 
the employees[ ] who have attended the meeting, sometimes altered, and then sent to the [employer] in the name of 
the QA program rather than as an individual employee’s suggestion.  Thereafter, the [employer] either accepts or 
rejects the ideas or returns them to the next QA program meeting for further development.”). 
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such beneficial interactions as unlawful. 
The potential benefits of employer-supported work groups are widespread, although not 
universal.105 In some cases, managers will enthusiastically adopt measures to enhance 
opportunities for employee voice to take advantage of the production improvements and 
increased job satisfaction gained from employee input; in other cases, managers will adopt such 
measures by necessity to remain competitive in the marketplace.106 In sharp contrast to the 
strictly hierarchical manufacturing model of the 1930s, such input is considerably more 
important in the modern economy, where the need for workers to think and make suggestions is 
much higher than when the NLRA was enacted.107 Employee work groups may also provide an 
alternative to resolve workplace disputes that both employers and employees find more 
beneficial than other methods.108 Employers that are open to more employee voice may also 
discover that employees develop more loyalty and attachment to the firm.109 
105 Studies examining employee participation programs typically conclude that they have positive (if not always 
large) effects on productivity and employee earnings, but do not in general decrease per unit labor costs and increase 
profitability.  See Hirsch, Labor Law Obstacles, supra note 45, at 969-76, 982 (discussing benefits of employee 
participation in workplace decision-making and citing studies).  The literature suggests that such programs are not 
without costs and that competition eventually leads to any net savings from such programs to be passed through to 
consumers in lower prices.  Lowering the cost of adopting such programs should increase their use and increase 
economy-wide productivity.  See Peter Cappelli & David Neumark, Do “High Performance” Work Practices 
Improve Establishment-Level Outcomes?, 54 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 737 (2001) (discussing methodological 
difficulties in measuring causal effects of workplace organization, surveying prior studies, and providing 
longitudinal evidence). 
106 See Freeman & Rogers, supra note 21, at 7, 103-07 (describing survey results showing that a significant number 
of managers favor more employee voice in joint work committees and discussing productivity gains possible 
through employee involvement programs); Weiler, A Principled Reshaping, supra note 57, at 198; cf. Hirsch, Labor 
Law Obstacles, supra note 45, at 982 (citing data on employee ownership effects on firm performance).  But see 
Levine, supra note 11, at 63 (stating that “[m]any middle- and lower-level managers resist and sometimes sabotage 
employee involvement . . . [because greater employee autonomy] may be threatening to supervisors and managers”). 
107 See Barenberg, Democracy and Domination, supra note 72, at 885-90, 926 n. 826 (discussing numerous 
examples of successful flexible work teams and citing studies showing improvement in productivity, quality, and 
innovation from increased employee involvement); Estreicher, supra note 32, at 135-39 (describing importance of 
“smart” workers who can fully understand the business, make use of new technologies, and make suggestions to the 
employer). 
108 See Freeman & Rogers, supra note 21, at 136-38 (discussing workplace committees that monitor labor 
standards); Hyde, supra note 90, at 153-54 (describing advantages of work “caucuses” over other responses to work 
grievances, such as quitting, internalizing complaints, or litigating). 
109 See Clyde Summers, Employee Voice and Employer Choice:  A Structured Exception to Section 8(a)(2), 69 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 129, 135 (1993) (discussing the benefits of the “shared enterprise” model of employment in Germany 
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Labor law reform that relaxed the Board’s current company union prohibition would 
effectively expand choices for many employees.  Employees who have little prospect for seeing 
formal collective bargaining in their workplace would have the option to take part in a group that 
provides some outlet for voice, while enjoying NLRA protection for their participation. 
The possible gains from employer-supported work groups’ flexibility and ingenuity are 
well-illustrated by the variety in the structure of the groups themselves.  Avenues for employee 
voice may arise from groups formed for nonproduction purposes, such as a diversity committee.  
Moreover, other entities—such as work teams that concentrate on certain projects or production 
issues, or groups that are focused on procedures, policies, or rules—can foster employee input 
and feedback.110 It is not surprising, therefore, that studies have shown the use of some form of 
employee work groups is reasonably widespread and growing.111 
Although unions are concerned that employer-supported work groups might replace 
them,112 it is also possible that the process of electing worker representatives or exercising voice 
 
and Japan).  The potential benefits of employer-run work groups have been recognized in other areas as well.  For 
example, a failed amendment to the Occupational Health and Safety Act would have required health and safety 
committees in most workplaces.  See H.R. 1280, 103rd Cong. (1993); H.R. 3160, 102nd Cong. (1991); see also 
Estlund, supra note 2, at 1541 n.69 (stating that such groups can improve safety) (citing Gregory R. Watchman, Safe 
and Sound:  The Case for Safety and Health Committees Under OSHA and the NLRA, 4 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
65, 82-89 (1994)); Matthew W. Finkin, Employee Representation Outside the Labor Act:  Thoughts on Arbitral 
Representation, Group Arbitration, and Workplace Committees, 5 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 75, 91-96 (2002) 
(discussing state legislation mandating workplace safety committees); Randy S. Rabinowitz & Mark M. Hager, 
Designing Health and Safety:  Workplace Hazard Regulation in the United States and Canada, 33 CORNELL INT’L
L.J. 373, 431 (2000)). 
110 See Estreicher, supra note 32, at 127 (describing production-focused groups as “on-line,” as distinguished from 
nonproduction “off-line” groups). 
111 See Bruce E. Kaufman, Does The NLRA Constrain Employee Involvement and Participation Programs in 
Nonunion Companies?:  A Reassessment, 17 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 729, 747-53 (1999) (describing results of 
various studies and noting that most of these groups are probably not affected by Section 8(a)(2)); Freeman & 
Rogers, supra note 21, at 92 (describing reports that one-third of employees said their employer met with 
committees of employees to resolve problems and over half said their employer had some form of an employee 
involvement system); Levine, supra note 11, at 7 (citing study showing that in 1990, 88% of companies had at least 
one worker involved with an employee-involvement program). 
112 See Jonathon P. Hiatt & Laurence E. Gold, Employer-Employee Committees:  A Union Perspective, in Kaufman 
& Taras, supra note 90, at 507-08. 
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in nonunion companies would complement the organization of traditional unions.113 Other 
countries have much higher union density rates, even though they do not foreclose employer-
initiated or -supported work groups that might engage in discussions over compensation and 
working conditions.  For example, employer-supported nonunion work groups are permitted and 
not uncommon in Canada,114 where traditional unions and collective bargaining operate at levels 
higher than in the U.S.115 
Some countries, Germany being the prime example, mandate that some form of elected 
employee work group be available to workers, a right that has now been adopted by the 
European Union.116 German employers are often supportive of these “works councils,” finding 
that a good working relationship with them is productive.117 More to the point, German works 
councils are often closely tied to trade unions and have historically fed unions with new 
 
113 See Julius Getman, The National Labor Relations Act:  What Went Wrong; Can We Fix It? 45 B.C. L. REV. 125, 
145 (2003) (noting that the steel unions and National Education Association evolved in part from company unions); 
Estlund, supra note 2 at 1545, 1551, 1601 (arguing that allowing some sort of employer work groups might spur 
innovation among unions); Estreicher, supra note 32, at 153-54; Barenberg, Democracy and Domination, supra note 
72, at 831-35 (discussing pre-NLRA company unions morphing into traditional, independent unions).  But see 
Freeman & Rogers, supra note 21, at 113-15 (describing survey results showing that workers at firms with employee 
involvement programs have less interest in traditional unions, although noting that such programs do not lessen 
support for union at unionized firm). 
114 For a good history of Canada’s law in this area, see LeRoy, supra note 11, at 1669-73; see also Weiler, A
Principled Reshaping, supra note 57, at 199 n.44. 
115 See Kaufman, Constrain, supra note 111, at 805-06 (arguing that Canadian union density of 34% is due, in part, 
to independent unions co-opting employer-initiated work groups and a legal regime that better protects employee 
free choice). 
116 The European Union Charter contains a provision establishing a fundamental right of workers or their 
representatives to information and consultation in the workplace.  See Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union art. 27, 2000 O.J. (C 364) 1, available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/unit/charte/en/charter-
solidarity.html.  Paul Weiler has suggested that the U.S. adopt basically the same requirements as Germany.  See 
Weiler, Governing the Workplace, supra note 8, at 282-95.  Others have made similar suggestions.  See, e.g.,
Summers, supra note 109, at 130-32; Hyde, supra note 90, at 152 & n.9; Richard B. Freeman & Joel Rogers, Who 
Speaks For Us?  Employee Representation in a Nonunion Labor Market, in EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION:
ALTERNATIVES AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 14 (Bruce E. Kaufman & Morris M. Kleiner eds., 1993) (suggesting 
encouragement of such groups through government incentives). 
117 See Summers, supra note 109, at 132 (noting that Japanese employers typically accept that country’s similar 
“enterprise unions” as well); see also Levine, supra note 11, at 3-4, 115-21 (discussing widespread employee-
involvement in Europe and Japan); Charles C. Heckscher, THE NEW UNIONISM: EMPLOYEE INVOLVEMENT IN THE 
CHANGING CORPORATION 177-231 (1988) (arguing for “associational unions” that exist to develop and enforce 
agreements at a specific employer). 
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members.118 It is true, however, that although activation of a works council is a simple process, 
workers do not find it necessary to do so in a sizable share of German workplaces, and the recent 
decline in works council members reinforces a slide in union membership.119 Further, China’s 
government-sponsored union, which does not typically engage in collective bargaining, has done 
what previously seemed impossible—convince Wal-Mart to voluntarily allow the union to 
represent all of its employees in that country.120 It is not clear what influence the Chinese union 
will have on Wal-Mart’s operations in that country.  However, it is hard to imagine that having 
Wal-Mart or other nonunion companies in the U.S. engage in discussions with worker 
representatives will result in lower private sector union density than would otherwise exist. 
This diversity of employer-supported worker participation schemes illustrates the ability 
of work groups to adapt to the unique circumstances of a wide variety of companies, workers, 
and societies.  Such flexibility and innovation provide more promise for employee participation 
and voice in the private sector than do traditional unions, although management and workers in 
many establishments will not opt to implement vehicles for employee voice.  We should see 
adoption of employer-supported work groups where such activity has the greatest potential 
benefit.  These potential benefits from nonunion work groups are currently limited, to some 
unknown degree, by the NLRA’s expansive company union prohibition.  To the extent that 
employer-supported work groups created as a result of NLRA reforms prove effective, 
competitive pressures will induce their adoption by other companies.  If ineffective, such reforms 
will have little impact.  
 
118 See John T. Addison, Claus Schnabel & Joachim Wagner, The (Parlous) State of German Unions 9 (IZA 
Discussion Paper No. 2000, 2006), JOURNAL OF LABOR RESEARCH (forthcoming), available at 
www.iza.org/en/webcontent/publications/papers. 
119 Id. (showing that in 2004, just one in ten German establishments had works councils in the private sector, which 
included 47% of all employees in Western Germany and 38% in Eastern Germany; the significantly higher 
employee- versus establishment-density resulting because works councils exist primarily at larger establishments).  
In addition to declining union density, there also has been greater decentralization of bargaining.  Id. 
120 See David Barboza, Wal-Mart Agrees to Unionization in China, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 2006. 
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By making many of these groups unlawful—particularly the most effective ones, which 
often involve substantial interactions between employees and management—the NLRA’s 
company union ban has impeded the development of groups that could provide significant 
improvement for workers, employers, society, and possibly even traditional unions.  
Consequently, we support modification of the NLRA’s prohibition against employer-sponsored 
work groups.  A change that best reflects our four reform criteria121 would maintain restrictions 
against company domination of traditional unions, while permitting the development in nonunion 
companies of less formal work groups.  These work groups would not participate in formal 
collective bargaining, but could communicate with management and participate in workplace 
discussions, including those regarding pay, grievances, and working conditions. 
Our recommendation is to change Section 2(5)’s definition of labor organization to 
include only those entities that have been certified by the Board, or recognized by an employer, 
as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of a unit of employees under Section 9 of 
the NLRA.122 The modification would permit employers to create or maintain work groups that 
discuss terms and conditions of employment, so long as those groups are not labor organizations 
as defined by the revised Section 2(5).123 This offers employers virtually unfettered opportunity 
to promote the sharing of information without the specter of a Section 8(a)(2) violation, while 
 
121 See supra note 65 and accompanying text. 
122 29 U.S.C. § 159(a), (c), (e) (stating Board’s certification process and authority to evaluate questions whether an 
exclusive bargaining representative enjoys support from a majority of employees). 
123 This proposal has similarities with a proposal made by Samuel Estreicher, see Estreicher, supra note 32, at 150 
(proposing limiting Section 2(5)’s definition of labor organization to groups that “bargain with” employers over 
terms and conditions of employment), and a House-passed Taft-Hartley bill in 1947, see H.R. Rep. No. 80-245, at 
54 (1947), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947, at 345 (1948) 
(stating that it would not be an unfair labor practice for an employer to form or maintain “a committee of employees 
and discussing with it matters of mutual interest, including [terms and conditions of work], if the Board has not 
certified or the employer has not recognized a representative . . . under section 9”).  This bill took care to allow 
“discussions” without imposing a formal duty to “bargain” on the organization or the employer.  See id.; LeRoy, 
supra note 11, at 1704-05 (providing bill’s history).  Indeed, the bill stated that Section 8(a)(2) would still bar an 
employer from creating a formal organization with common characteristics of a labor union.  See H.R. Rep. No. 8-
245, at 54. 
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maintaining the major policy aims of that provision.  Section 8(a)(2)’s goal of preventing 
employers from coercing or misleading employees into thinking that they have independent 
representation would be maintained, as employees would be well aware whether or not they are 
represented by an independent union.  Moreover, as is the case currently, an employer would still 
be unable to discuss conditions of employment with its work group if there was already a union 
on the scene.124 
Unlike other proposals, such as the failed TEAM Act,125 which call for changes to the 
definition of labor organization, the proposed modification ensures that non-Section 9 work 
groups cannot take advantage of the protections that independent labor organizations enjoy under 
the NLRA.126 For example, the certification, recognition, and contract bars—which preclude 
 
124 Any attempt to deal with represented employees about terms and conditions of employment without going 
through the union violates the employer’s duty to bargain under the NLRA and is considered unlawful “direct 
dealing.”  See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (making it an unfair labor practice for an employer “to refuse to bargain 
collectively with the representatives of its employees”); Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 678, 684 
(1944); Toledo Typographical Union No. 63 v. NLRB (Toledo Blade), 907 F.2d 1220, 1222 (D.C. Cir. 1990); 
Estreicher, supra note 32, at 151-52 
125 The “Teamwork for Employees and Managers Act of 1995,” H.R. 743, 104th Cong. (1995) (“TEAM Act”), 
would have lowered restrictions on employer-sponsored workplace participation groups.  The TEAM Act would 
have created a proviso to Section 8(a)(2) stating that it is not unlawful: 
for an employer to establish, assist, maintain, or participate in any organization or entity of any kind, in 
which employees who participate to at least the same extent practicable as representatives of management 
participate, to address matters of mutual interest, including, but not limited to, issues of quality, 
productivity, efficiency, and safety and health, and which does not have, claim, or seek authority to be the 
exclusive bargaining representatives of the employees or to negotiate or enter into collective bargaining 
agreements with the employer or to amend existing collective bargaining agreements between the 
employer and any labor organization, except . . . a case in which a labor organization is the representative 
of such employees as provided in section 9(a). 
Id. The House and Senate passed the TEAM Act, which Present Clinton then vetoed.  See 142 Cong. Rec. 
H8816 (1996). 
126 One could also exclude groups created by employers to thwart organizing campaigns, see Estreicher, supra note 
32, at 155; Summers, supra note 116, at 142 (arguing that a plan should not be allowed if an organizing campaign or 
representation proceeding was pending), or where an employer had recently committed an unfair labor practice, see 
Summers, supra note 116, at 142 (arguing for ban where unfair labor practice charge was pending or was found to 
have been committed within the last three years); Hyde, supra note 90, at 190 (same).  There have been many other 
alternatives proposed as well.  See, e.g., Summers, supra note 116, at 142-45 (proposing exceptions to Section 
8(a)(2) for plans that, among other things, allow employees to modify plan’s structure, separate supervisors and non-
supervisors, allow employee-elected representatives, and require an employer to bargain); LeRoy, supra note 11, at 
1708-09 (proposing that Section 8(a)(2) allow employers to create a group that discusses work conditions, but does 
not claim or seek to be an exclusive bargaining representative); Weiler, A Principled Reshaping, supra note 57, at 
200 (arguing that Section 8(a)(2) should ban only company-sponsored unions that collectively bargain, rather than 
merely deal with the employer); Hyde, supra note 90, at 187-90 (arguing that “labor organization” should be defined 
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rival unions from seeking to represent workers for a period of time after an incumbent union 
becomes the employees’ representative127 or during much of the existence of a collective-
bargaining agreement128—will not apply to these work groups.  Thus, employers and employees 
would be able to engage in information-sharing without fear of violating the NLRA.   
Information-sharing would also be promoted by the clarity of the test—it is unmistakable, 
ex ante, whether or not a group is a Section 2(5) labor organization.129 Employers that want to 
establish a work group may do so without risk of a future Section 8(a)(2) violation.  Importantly, 
the modification favors neither traditional unionism nor employer-supported work groups; 
employees who want representation by an independent union may still pursue that goal without 
interference by the employer.130 This heightens employee choice and encourages competition 
between unions and employers to fulfill employee demands. 
Employer-supported work groups may also benefit from not being considered labor 
organizations.  Avoiding that designation frees a group from the risk of liability for unfair labor 
practices under Section 8(b) of the NLRA131 and the reporting and disclosure requirements under 
 
as any group that employees participate in and that “deals with”—to be broadly defined and including 
communicating or exercising delegated management authority—employers concerning any condition of work, and 
that an employer should be allowed to support a labor organization if approved by employees via secret ballot for a 
specified time period); Charles B. Craver, The National Labor Relations Act Must Be Revised To Preserve Industrial 
Democracy, 34 ARIZ. L. REV. 397, 420, 430-31 (1992) (proposing no Section 8(a)(2) violation unless employer 
unilaterally establishes group with purpose of chilling or precluding organizing). 
127 Under the certification bar, an incumbent union enjoys an irrebuttable presumption of majority status for 
typically a year following certification; during that year, the Board will not order an election and the employer may 
not withdraw recognition, even if another union claims to have majority support.  See Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96, 
98-104 (1958).  Under the recognition bar, an incumbent union enjoys a irrebuttable presumption of majority status 
for a “reasonable period” after being recognized by the employer as the employees’ representative.  See Keller 
Plastics E., Inc., 157 N.L.R.B. 583, 586-87 (1966). 
128 Under the contract bar, an active collective bargaining agreement will inoculate the incumbent union from 
challenges to its majority status for a maximum of three years.  See Gen Cable Corp., 139 N.L.R.B. 1123, 1125 
(1962). 
129 See Summers, supra note 116, at 141 (stressing the need for “reasonably clear” line between lawful and unlawful 
employee participation groups). 
130 See Weiler, A Principled Reshaping, supra note 57, at 178 (stating that key interests in labor law “are those of 
workers, rather than the unions who represent them or the companies who employ them”). 
131 See 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (establishing “labor organization” unfair labor practices, such as restraints on picketing). 
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the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (“LMRDA”).132 Freedom from these laws 
could help spur the growth of work groups by allowing them to develop outside of federal labor 
restrictions133 Similarly, in order to keep regulatory and employer costs low, there would be few, 
if any, legal requirements attached to the structure of employer-supported work groups.  For 
example, although many employers would designate that employee representatives be freely 
elected, there would be no such requirement.134 Despite the lack of legal requirements, self-
enforcing mechanisms would often advance employees’ interests, as work groups without strong 
support from the workforce would have little credibility or effectiveness. 
Current law hinders the flexibility and originality that could serve to fill a much-needed 
niche for workers.  By reducing the costs of creating nontraditional work groups, the proposal 
would allow more workers to fulfill their desire for some form of representation or voice at 
work.  Moreover, because participation in these groups would generally be considered concerted 
and protected activity under the NLRA, employers could not retaliate against or interfere with 
such activity without violating the Act.135 
At the same time that Congress amends Section 2(5) to encourage employer-supported 
 
132 See id. §§ 430 (establishing LMRDA reporting and disclosure obligations), 439 (imposing fines or incarceration 
for failing to file required reports under LMRDA); Hyde, New Institutions, supra note 74, at 522-23 (noting that 
avoiding the need to service collective-bargaining agreements can save money).  Note that the LMRDA’s definition 
of labor organization is broader than the NLRA’s definition.  29 U.S.C. § 402(i) (defining “labor organization” as 
“any organization of any kind, any agency, or employee representation committee, group, association, or plan so 
engaged in which employees participate and which exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with 
employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours, or other terms or conditions of 
employment” and also including “any conference, general committee, joint or system board, or joint council so 
engaged which is subordinate to a national or international labor organization, other than a State or local central 
body”).  Such groups would also avoid—perhaps less defensibly—the requirement to observe democratic processes 
and a duty of fair representation to its members.  See 29 U.S.C. §§ 411-415, 481-504 (LMRDA democratic 
requirements); Air Line Pilots Ass’n v. O’Neil, 499 U.S. 65, 74-78 (1991) (discussing duty of fair representation). 
133 See Hyde, New Institutions, supra note 74, at 508 (discussing group, “ROC-NY,” that obtained contract on behalf 
of some New York City restaurant workers that was expressly not collective bargaining agreement).  However, 
Hyde rightly questions whether ROC-NY would be able to avoid a finding that it was a labor organization if its 
status was ever challenged.  Id. at 509 n.31. 
134 Subsequent discussions of conditional deregulation and a change in the labor law default each include the 
requirement that work group representatives be freely elected.  See supra Sections III.B, III.C. 
135 See infra note 193. 
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nonunion work groups, however, it should also adopt other changes to the NLRA that strengthen 
the Board’s ability to remedy employer unfair labor practices or other inappropriate obstacles to 
organizing.  Employers are currently able to interfere with employees’ decision whether or not to 
pursue collective representation with little cost.  The lack of a significant penalty for interfering 
with employees’ rights calls into question whether those rights have much value.  Strengthening 
the Board’s enforcement powers while also relaxing the company union ban would give 
employers more freedom to establish work groups and, at the same time, provide better 
protection of employees’ right to freely choose whether to participate in the employer-sponsored 
group rather than a more independent form of collective activity. 
One reform particular to the company union prohibition is to change current holdings that 
refuse to consider a Section 8(a)(2) unfair labor practice as a “continuing violation.”136 The 
result is that an employer can create and dominate a labor organization, sign a contract 
“negotiated” with the organization, and—if not challenged within the NLRA’s 6-month statute 
of limitations137—avoid any Section 8(a)(2) problems during the life of the contract.138 The 
harm created by a contract negotiated with an employer-dominated labor organization should not 
be permitted to continue simply because, as is often the case, no one was prepared to file a 
Section 8(a)(2) charge at the time the contract was signed.139 Although this is not a widespread 
problem, such a change is consistent with the philosophy of the Act and the reforms proposed in 
this Article. 
136 Sav-On Drugs, Inc., 253 N.L.R.B. 816, 824 n.19 (1980), enforced, 728 F.2d 1254 (9th Cir. 1984) (citing Local 
Lodge No. 1424, Int’l Ass’n of Machinists (Bryan Mfg. Co.) v. NLRB., 362 U.S. 411, 419-23 (1960) (holding that 
Section 10(b)’s sixth-month statute of limitations bars challenge to lawfulness of execution of collective-bargaining 
agreement and “continuing violation” theory is inapplicable if enforcement of agreement is not, by itself, unlawful). 
137 29 U.S.C. § 160(b). 
138 See Armored Transp., Inc., 334 N.L.R.B. 143, 145, 148 (2001), enforcement denied on other grounds sub nom. 
AT Sys. W., Inc. v. NLRB, 294 F.3d 136 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 
139 Generally, Section 8(a)(2) charges are filed by independent unions that seek to represent a unit of employees only 
to find an employer-sponsored labor organization already in place.  See id. at 148. 
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It is also important that employees’ right to choose independent union representation be 
adequately protected.  In this vein, Samuel Estreicher has identified the need to proscribe work 
groups created in response to an organizing campaign, to strengthen protections against 
retaliatory discharges, to increase union access to employees, and to decrease the incentive to 
delay the representational process through litigation.140 Other changes could include permitting 
private rights of action,141 increasing the use of injunctive relief,142 and accelerating elections.143 
More generally, Congress needs to strengthen the Board’s limited remedial power.144 For 
instance, although employer-dominated “sham” unions are not widespread, the Board’s sole 
remedial power against even the most egregious Section 8(a)(2) violations is to post notices and 
to disestablish such entities, neither of which is likely to dissuade employers committed to 
creating them.145 Giving the Board enhanced authority to punish employer unfair labor 
practices—particularly through monetary fines—would impose real costs that an employer must 
 
140 Estreicher, supra note 32, at 155. 
141 Employers currently have the right, under Section 303 of the LMRA, to sue in federal court for damages caused 
by union secondary boycotts.  See 29 U.S.C. § 187(b) (providing suit for damages caused by violation of Section 
8(b)(4) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)).  Providing a private right of action would also enhance nonunion 
employees’ exercise of their right to pursue collective action.  Few employees are aware that the NLRA applies in 
the nonunion setting, and the NLRB could do more to advertise that fact.  Private actions, particularly if attorney 
fees and other damages were available, would drastically increase nonunion employees’ exercise of their NLRA 
rights, thereby maintain the Act’s relevance in an economy that is overwhelmingly nonunion.  See Estlund, supra 
note 2, at 1555 (arguing that private right of action would provide more effective enforcement than currently exists 
under the NLRA). 
142 Cf. Weiler, A Principled Reshaping, supra note 57, at 189-90, 205 (arguing for quicker enforcement of 
reinstatement orders through injunctive relief, expedited elections, and a ban on permanent replacement of strikers).  
The Board General Counsel may seek injunctive relief against employer unfair labor practices pursuant to Section 
10(j), but must seek such relief against union secondary boycotts under Section 10(l).  See 29 U.S.C. § 160(j), (l). 
143 See Kaufman, Constrain, supra note 111, at 800 (proposing maximum of four weeks between representation 
petition and election); Craver, supra note 126, at 420 (proposing two week maximum).  Other options, which are not 
endorsed here, include mandated employer neutrality and card-check recognition, as the proposed Employee Free 
Choice Act would require.  See supra note 70. 
144 Criticism of the Board’s limited remedial power has been widespread.  See, e.g., Estlund, supra note 2, at 1538-
39 (citing other criticisms). 
145 See Kaufman, Constrain, supra note 111, at 776-77 & n. 147 (describing management statements and NLRB 
enforcement statistics indicating some employers run work groups that they know may be unlawful because of weak 
penalties and low risk of a Section 8(a)(2) violation). 
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take into account before attempting to interfere with employees’ rights under the Act.146 
The current company union prohibition harms both employers who want more input from 
their workers and employees who would like to provide such input, but do not want traditional 
union representation.147 By removing the threat of a Section 8(a)(2) violation for employers that 
value employee input, whether as a benefit to the firm or as a means to attract workers,148 the 
proposed modification expands opportunities for worker voice and participation.  It is difficult to 
see how this expansion would be detrimental.149 Employees preferring an independent union can 
still pursue that path.  Employees who want enhanced voice but do not want a union, or are 
employed at a firm where unionization is not a realistic possibility, would be better off if the 
NLRA’s company union restriction were modified to allow more development of employer-
supported work groups.150 
As noted, it is unlikely that weakening the company union prohibition would greatly 
 
146 Cf. Weiler, A Principled Reshaping, supra note 57, at 188 (noting that Board damage awards in even 
discriminatory discharge cases are significantly limited and delayed). 
147 As Clyde Summers has suggested, the current legal framework—particularly the extent to which it allows 
employers to fight unionization—is likely a significant factor in many employees’ stated preference for more voice, 
but not through a traditional union.  See Summers, supra note 116, at 138.  Absent substantial employer hostility, 
employees may prefer traditional unions to a much larger degree.  Id. The proposal here addresses part of this 
problem by pairing the modification of the company union prohibition with remedial changes that would increase 
enforcement and penalties for employer unfair labor practices.  See supra notes 136-143 and accompanying text. 
148 See Freeman & Rogers, supra note 21, at 6 (describing survey result that employees typically welcome 
employer-initiated employee-involvement programs, although would prefer them to give employees more authority). 
149 The lack of a significant cost to this change is in relation to the current state of unionism in the U.S.  See Estlund, 
supra note 2, at 1547, 1550-51.  It is true, of course, that the modification proposed here would allow plans that do 
not necessarily represent a majority of workers and that could give employers more leeway to set up a sham 
organization that only pretends to take employee input into account.  See Summers, supra note 116, at 147.  These 
possibilities, however, will often be discernable to employees—at least eventually—which undermines their threat 
to employees.  Moreover, employers seeking to infringe employees’ freedom to unionize currently have many other 
options, most of which are far more effective; thus, the possibility that an occasional employer will have another 
weapon in its arsenal is not a significant cost.  Indeed, if penalties against employers increase, it is likely that this 
potential cost is vastly outweighed by the benefits of greater protection against employer interference.  See supra 
notes 136-143 and accompanying text. 
150 Indeed, prior to the enactment of the NLRA, some company unions were recognized as providing benefits to 
employees through assistance with grievances, information gathering, communication with employers, and 
improving wages, benefits, and other conditions of work.  See Barenberg, Democracy and Domination, supra note 
72, at 849-51.  Barenberg also notes that the benefits of company unions were often ultimately overshadowed by 
unmet employee desires and, in the 1920s, most employers eventually discontinued their company unions; however, 
he recognizes that the earlier company unions were far less collaborative than modern work groups.  See id. at 860-
61, 875-79. 
37
damage traditional unionism.151 To be sure, the proposal may make organizing more difficult in 
some circumstances, but much of that difficulty would arise from workers being satisfied with 
the level of input they enjoy via their employer-sponsored work group.  It is up to the union to 
convince employees that traditional unionism would be better.  Thus, in addition to providing 
more employee voice, encouraging work groups would spur competition and innovation by 
traditional unions and give employees a taste of collective representation—possibly resulting in a 
higher level of union density.152 Indeed, the company union prohibition under the Railway 
Labor Act153 (“RLA”) is narrower than the NLRB’s, yet union density is significantly higher in 
industries covered by the RLA.154 The goal, however, should not be purely to bolster traditional 
unionism.  What is more important is that competition and complementarity between union and 
nonunion vehicles of worker voice are likely to pull traditional unions in a direction aimed more 
 
151 See supra notes 113-117 and accompanying text. 
152 See Kye Pawlenko, Reevaluating Inter-Union Competition:  A Proposal To Resurrect Rival Unionism, 8 U. PA. J. 
LAB. & EMP. L. 651, 682-88 (2006) (arguing that increased competition among unions will result in increased union 
membership); Rafael Gomez & Morley Gunderson, The Experience Good Model of Trade Union Membership, in 
THE CHANGING ROLE OF UNIONS, supra note 72, at 92, 102-08 (arguing that union membership is an “experience 
good”—a good or service whose attributes and quality are hard to discern prior to purchase or exposure); Estlund, 
supra note 2, at 1545 (arguing that allowing some sort of employer work groups might spur innovation among 
unions); LeRoy, supra note 11, at 1702, 1711-12 (noting Canadian example of a work group transforming into a 
traditional union, and a similar transformation in the U.S. at AT&T) (citing Daphne Gottlieb Taras & Jason 
Cropping, The Transition from Formal Nonunion Representation to Unionization:  A Contemporary Case, 52 
INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 22 (1998)); Hyde, supra note 90, at 160 (arguing that work groups might lead to 
unionization and may allow some form of union representation in workplaces where there is not majority support for 
the union). 
153 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188. 
154 The RLA states that representatives “shall be designated by the respective parties without interference, influence, 
or coercion by either party over the designation of representatives by the other; and neither party shall in any way 
interfere with, influence, or coerce the other in its choice of representatives,” id. § 152 (Third), and that it “shall be 
unlawful for any carrier to interfere in any way with the organization of its employees, or to use the funds of the 
carrier in maintaining or assisting or contributing to any labor organization, labor representative, or other agency of 
collective bargaining,” id. § 152 (Fourth).  The RLA defines “representative as “any person or persons, labor union, 
organization, or corporation designated either by a carrier or group of carriers or by its or their employees, to act for 
it or them.”  Id. § 151 (Sixth).  This suggests that the RLA’s company union prohibition, unlike Section 8(a)(2), 
extends only to organizations that act in a representational role in collective bargaining activities.  See Samuel 
Estreicher, Nonunion Employee Representation:  A Legal/Policy Perspective, in Kaufman & Taras, supra note 90, at 
215.  Although not attributable—at least not to any significant degree—to differences in the NLRA’s and RLA’s 
company union prohibitions, the union density in industries covered by the RLA is much higher than the current 
overall private sector rate of just under 8%.  For example, in 2005 the union density in the air transportation industry 
was 49.4% and in the rail transportation industry union density was 72.9%.  See www.unionstats.com.  
38
at value creation and less at rent appropriation. 
Most workforces will remain nonunion in the current economic environment.  The 
choice, then, is between the status quo or more nonunion workplaces with enhanced employee 
input.  As evidenced by the Dunlop Commission report and subsequent literature, many 
employees say they want such input.155 The highly competitive environment in which U.S. firms 
operate will provide both an incentive to develop welfare-enhancing innovations in workplace 
governance and a constraint on developments that transfer rents but do not add value.  If welfare-
enhancing innovations develop, adoption could be widespread; if not, there will be little change.  
Whatever the eventual effects, employer response is likely to be slow.  Despite management 
protestations, the extent to which current law provides an overwhelming barrier to nonunion 
work groups is unclear156 and their use may be limited to a significant degree by management 
reluctance to increase worker participation.157 Relaxation of the current restrictions would be a 
change in the right direction, however, encouraging and publicly sanctioning participation and 
cooperation in nonunion companies.158 
B. Changing the Labor Law Default 
A particularly broad reform that could prompt far greater development of nontraditional 
work groups than modifications to the company union ban would be to change the labor law 
default from its current nonunion setting.  One alternative default would be a governance 
 
155 See supra notes 57-61. 
156 See supra note 145 and accompanying text.  But see Kaufman, Constrain, supra note 111, at 753, 777-78 
(describing interviews with managers who sought to avoid the cost and embarrassment of Section 8(a)(2) litigation 
or to avoid giving a union grounds to file an unfair labor practice charge).  
157 It would take further change in employers’ view of the role of employees to significantly increase the use of such 
groups.  Employers in the U.S. are seeking more employee input then they did decades ago, but have yet to 
completely buy into the idea of employees as true partners in the enterprise.  See Summers, supra note 116, at 131, 
136 (noting that American employers have emulated Japan’s quality circles, but have resisted allowing employee 
voice in more substantial decisions).  That said, the use of such groups is growing and fewer restrictions would 
likely further that trend.  See Freeman & Rogers, supra note 21, at 7, 62 (reporting survey results showing that many 
managers favor some employee involvement); Kaufman, Constrain, supra note 111, at 753, 804-05 (noting growth 
in the U.S. and far greater use of such groups in Canada). 
158 See Estlund, supra note 2, at 1548-49 (discussing effects of Section 8(a)(2) on work groups). 
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structure with some level of independent worker voice that does not rise to the level of formal 
collective bargaining—perhaps similar to Germany’s works councils.159 This default could be 
waived or replaced with the express approval of employees and management.160 As is the case 
for German works councils, one may want to require that the voice mechanism be activated only 
in those establishments where it is requested by employees, while also exempting very small 
establishments.161 
At first blush, one might think that changing the default would have little effect.  Labor 
law’s current nonunion default allows a majority of workers to either choose union 
representation or subsequently decertify a union.162 If union representation were the default, a 
majority of workers could similarly decertify the union as their agent or subsequently elect a 
union.  This raises the question whether, in a frictionless system, employee preferences would be 
unaffected by the initial default and thus lead to the same low level of private sector union 
coverage seen today.  The answer is no.  The labor law default has a significant effect on the 
resulting governance structure, even when a low cost procedure to move away from the default 
exists.  Shifting to a union default, for example, would lead to widespread union decertification, 
but not to a steady-state private sector density as low as the current 8%.163 
The default’s importance results from several factors.  One reason is that the NLRA 
 
159 Other commentators have discussed changing the default.  See Estlund, supra note 2, at 1594-95; Cass Sunstein, 
Human Behavior and the Law of Work, 87 VA. L. REV. 205, 256-57 (2001); Barenberg, Democracy and 
Domination, supra note 72, at 959-60; cf. Weiler, Governing the Workplace, supra note 8, at 228-32 (discussing the 
hurdles to unionization caused by the current default). 
160 Workable standards for determining whether an agreement to move from the default has been reached could 
include an election among workers or the type of unmistakable evidence required to find that a union has waived its 
right to bargain over a certain issue.  See Metro. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 460 U.S. 693, 708 (1983) (holding that a 
valid waiver must be “explicitly stated” and “clear and unmistakable”). 
161 If the new labor law default is deemed by employers to be costly, one would see a spike in the number of small 
establishments holding employment to just below the coverage level. 
162 See 29 U.S.C. § 159. 
163 See supra note 16. 
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certification and decertification process is far from frictionless.164 More important is that 
economic agents exhibit behavioral inertia, often sticking with an existing rule or environment as 
long as it does not differ too much from the preferred choice.165 The default also acts as a signal 
that the state or employer has deemed the default norm as appropriate.166 Further, as businesses 
engage in normal turnover, there is a tendency to move toward the default; currently, older 
businesses, including some that are unionized, are replaced by new businesses, which almost 
always begin as nonunion.167 Many workplaces, therefore, will not change from the default 
governance structure.  Yet, despite these factors, changing the default rule will not act as a 
mandate.  Rather, the default is a starting point—or bargaining “threat point”—from which the 
parties would remain free to move given mutual agreement.  
We see virtue in a default that establishes some form of independent work group, 
although not one with full collective bargaining rights.  Workers would retain their current right 
to form independent unions without management approval.  The default mechanism would 
specify standard procedures through which these independent work groups and management 
might discuss, negotiate, and approve mutually beneficial changes.  It is difficult to predict 
precisely how any given system might evolve and operate, and the default will not function well 
in all workplaces.  We suspect that in many, if not most, workplaces, employees would not 
invoke their right to engage in collective voice.  In other workplaces, the employer and workers 
would have incentive to move away from the default and develop proposals for participatory 
welfare-enhancing governance structures, whether in the form of unions or less formal work 
groups.  Over time, experience with such a system will lead to administrative and legislated 
 
164 See Barenberg, Democracy and Domination, supra note 72, at 933 (discussing costs of organizing and other 
types of collective action); Weiler, Governing the Workplace, supra note 8, at 114-15. 
165 See Sunstein, supra note 159, at 220-24. 
166 See id. at 225-26. 
167 See Barenberg, Democracy and Domination, supra note 72, at 932-33. 
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changes in the default. 
The inability to identify in advance all outcomes of a given reform is not a fatal flaw.  
The same can be said of any change, including the NLRA’s enactment in 1935.  Moreover, laws 
and regulations evolve in response to changing benefits and costs.  Adoption of a new workplace 
default would set off significant activity among management, workers, and workers’ agents to 
communicate, negotiate, and arrive at alternatives that make the parties better off. 
Such a major change in labor law obviously requires thorough analysis and careful 
design.  The actual working of such a system, however, would be determined in no small part by 
the way it evolves in the workplace, courts, and regulatory agencies.  Given the current 
stagnation in the NLRA’s governance of the changing workplace, a fundamental change such as 
shifting the default could provide a useful catalyst for important modifications and refinements 
of labor regulation.168 
C. Conditional Deregulation 
Another means to encourage the development of certain types of work groups is a 
modification along the lines of David Levine’s proposed “conditional deregulation.”  Under this 
proposal, a subset of governmental regulations would be waived if there is consent by both the 
company and an approved worker organization within the company.169 Levine recognizes that 
there are a large number of governmental mandates and regulatory measures regarding 
workplace safety, hours and overtime requirements, pensions, discrimination, family leave, and 
 
168 One concern in shifting the default toward collective voice is that such a change might transfer too much power 
to incumbent workers, leading to labor cost levels inconsistent with full employment.  It may prove difficult to limit 
the ability of work groups to appropriate rents within a framework that promotes voice and the evolution of welfare-
enhancing arrangements.  See Richard B. Freeman & Edward P. Lazear, An Economic Analysis of Works Councils,
in WORKS COUNCILS: CONSULTATION, REPRESENTATION, AND COOPERATION IN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 27-50 
(Joel Rogers & Wolfgang Streeck eds., 1995). 
169 David I. Levine, They Should Solve Their Own Problems:  Reinventing Workplace Regulation, in GOVERNMENT 
REGULATION OF THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP 475, 477 (Bruce E. Kaufman ed., 1997). 
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other subjects, but argues that one-size-fits-all rules are often inefficient.170 Instead, he contends 
that employee involvement in enforcing these rules could significantly lower the cost of 
workplace regulation.171 Although Levine’s focus is more efficient enforcement of workplace 
regulations, his proposal could also expand welfare-enhancing worker voice and participation. 
Under the Levine proposal, the default for nearly all firms would be the status quo—
coverage by the full extent of regulations.  These regulations would be divided into waivable and 
non-waivable rules, with the latter including a minimum set of standards, such as those dealing 
with discrimination or safety, required of all employers.172 Conditional deregulation would 
exempt employers from the waivable set of regulations and subject them only to the minimum 
standards if they voluntarily adopt alternative regulatory systems with employee oversight and 
approval.173 The expectation is that this form of conditional deregulation would be welfare-
enhancing for both workers and employers. 
In order to deregulate workplace standards, firms must have in place independent worker 
committees to perform the approval and oversight functions.  The union and employer would 
provide such authority within unionized companies.174 For nonunion employers, worker 
committees, created via a certified free election process, would have authority to approve the 
waiver on behalf of employees.175 Conditional deregulation would thus spur the establishment of 
worker associations throughout the private sector, providing a vehicle for nonunion worker 
participation and cooperation.  Such groups might also be used as an instrument to transfer quasi-
 
170 Id. at 478-79. 
171 Id. at 480. 
172 Id. at 478, 484. 
173 Id. at 493. 
174 Id. at 478. 
175 As Levine notes, this is similar to the experience in many European countries, where work councils often oversee 
workplace safety.  Id. at 478-79; see also supra notes 114-117. 
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rents from shareholders to workers.176 But rent-seeking should be limited given that employers 
can determine whether or not to stick with the default regulatory standard.  Therefore, although 
the details of any such plan are important, conditional deregulation offers an opportunity to 
foster nonunion voice and provide mutual gains to workers and employers in at least some 
workplaces.  
D. State and Local Labor Regulation 
Changes in the national labor law default or conditional deregulation require strong 
public and legislative support, neither of which look to occur imminently.  Richard Freeman and 
others have suggested that a more promising source for labor regulation reform—possibly 
including reforms that would encourage welfare-enhancing employee voice—is state 
legislation.177 The theory is that states’ successes and failures in implementing workplace 
regulations would be imitated and avoided, respectively, by other states.  Thus, to the extent that 
states have latitude to enact labor regulations, it is possible that state capitals may become the 
focal point for political action.178 Indeed, counties and municipalities already are often at the 
forefront of laws affecting the workplace, including sexual orientation anti-discrimination 
measures and living wage ordinances.179 
Significant limits to the state and local model exist, however.  The broad scope of NLRA 
preemption means that many major innovations in labor regulation would be permissible only at 
 
176 See supra note 36. 
177 See, e.g., Richard B. Freeman, Will Labor Fare Better Under State Labor Relations Law?, PROCS. LAB. & EMP.
REL. ASS’N ANN. MEETING (forthcoming 2006) (on file with authors) [hereinafter Freeman, State Labor Relations]. 
178 See Minimum Wage Was “Hot Button” Issue In State Labor Laws Enacted in 2005, 22 DAILY LABOR REPORT 
(BNA), Feb. 2, 2006, A-1 (reporting that states enacted more labor and employment legislation in 2005 than usual) 
(citing BLS report). 
179 See Indianapolis Adds Protections for Gays, Lesbians, 4 DAILY LABOR REPORT (BNA), Jan. 6, 2006, at A-11 
(reporting that Marion County, Indiana and Indianapolis enacted legislation prohibiting workplace sexual orientation 
discrimination); Susan J. McGolrick, Professor Examines Living Wage Law Growth In Comments to New York 
Labor Law Forum, 101 DAILY LABOR REPORT (BNA), May 26, 2004, at C-1 (stating that over 110 state and local 
living wage laws existed as of early 2004 and over 70 campaigns for such laws in other localities were taking place). 
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the federal level.180 Accordingly, federal labor preemption must drastically change for any 
significant state or local innovations in workplace governance to occur.  Because labor 
preemption is primarily a creation of the Supreme Court—based on its interpretation of 
congressional intent—such a modification is theoretically possible without legislation.181 Yet, 
the Court’s preemption jurisprudence began in earnest almost 50 years ago, and is unlikely to 
suddenly shift absent legislative action. 
The cost of federal preemption is that it forecloses what might otherwise be beneficial 
state labor and employment law innovations.  Were federal preemption relaxed, governance 
innovations adopted in large states would frequently lead national firms to implement them 
company-wide.  Moreover, if innovations in states of any size were viewed as welfare-
enhancing, other states would be more likely to copy them; governance innovations that are 
costly to firms or appear to provide few benefits to workers are least likely to be adopted.182 
Some variation in state employment regulation should also be welfare enhancing by allowing 
legal heterogeneity that reflects differences in the preferences of voters, in states’ economic 
environment, and in the legitimate influence of interest groups. 
Federal labor preemption, however, provides the obvious benefit of enabling employers 
 
180 The federal preemption barrier is recognized by Freeman.  See Freeman, State Labor Relations, supra note 177, 
at 1-2; see also San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959) (holding that NLRA generally 
preempts state action involving conduct that NLRA clearly protects or prohibits, or conduct that NLRA arguably 
protects or prohibits where there is danger to national labor policy in allowing state, rather than NLRB, to examine 
issue); Lodge 76, Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v. Wisc. Employment Relations Commc’n, 427 U.S. 132 (1976) 
(upholding “dormant preemption” that precludes state regulation where NLRA intends parties to freely engage in 
economic conflict); Estlund, supra note 2, 1570-77 (describing preemption and arguing for allowing more state and 
local labor regulation).  Interestingly, unions often face a much greater risk of entanglement with state law, as the 
preemption doctrine has increasingly allowed state liability for union conduct that is alleged to have violated state 
tort law.  See Jeffrey M. Hirsch, Taking State Property Rights Out of Federal Labor Law, 47 B.C. L. REV. __ 
(forthcoming 2006), (manuscript at 51-56, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=887957) 
[hereinafter Hirsch, Property Rights]; Getman, supra note 113, at 132 (citing libel, defamation, intentional infliction 
of emotional distress, and strike violence). 
181 See Machinists, 427 U.S. 132; Garmon, 359 U.S. 236. 
182 For example, several states require employer-sponsored safety committees, which in at least one state appears to 
have significantly lowered the cost of workplace injuries.  See Levine, supra note 169, at 481 (citing Oregon 
experience). 
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with establishments in more than one state to operate under the same legal regime.183 Variations 
in state regulations may produce other negative effects as well.  For example, politicians in some 
states may be overly sensitive to business interests and the location of new plants, thereby 
adopting labor and employment laws that may not be welfare enhancing.184 Politicians in other 
states may produce a set of labor and employment laws that are overly beneficial to incumbent 
workers, which may discourage new plants and job growth. 
In the end, the attractiveness of greater state and local flexibility depends on numerous 
factors that are difficult to assess.  Heterogeneity in states’ and localities’ underlying preferences 
and economic environments makes heterogeneity in the law more attractive.  Lack of uniformity 
in the law has a cost, however, particularly in a dynamic economy with considerable interstate 
(and international) commerce.  Legal experimentation and innovation can provide many of the 
same benefits as does competition in the private economy.  But the link is not nearly so clear-cut.  
Many reasonable persons will prefer to put all their eggs in a single basket of federal labor 
regulation than in the many baskets of various state labor laws.  A more nuanced analysis, one 
beyond the scope of this paper, would identify the specific forms of labor and employment 
regulation that might best operate at the federal level, and those for which state and local 
heterogeneity would be most beneficial.  
Regardless of one’s view of the attractiveness of state and local innovation in workplace 
governance, a move in that direction faces considerable political, legal, and economic barriers.185 
Accordingly, we believe that greater state and local labor regulation may expand welfare-
 
183 See, e.g., Erik Schelzig, FedEx’s Smith Warns of Regulating, MEMPHIS COMM. APPEAL (Aug. 16, 2006), at C2 
(quoting FedEx chairman warning conference of state legislatures that additional state regulation can drive business 
away because “commerce today is not local in virtually any respect”). 
184 This is a variant of the argument that states will “race to the bottom.” 
185 To varying degrees, much the same can be said for other reforms analyzed in this Article. 
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enhancing worker voice and participation in certain geographic areas, but is not a particularly 
promising avenue for the country as a whole.186 
E. The Internet 
The promotion of employee voice and participation also requires labor regulations that 
ensure employees’ freedom to use electronic communications to converse with each other about 
workplace concerns.  Email, weblogs, and websites, which we refer to simply as the “Internet,” 
have sharply lowered communication costs and are changing the way in which people interact.  
This change is highly significant for the workplace, as the Internet has become a vital tool for a 
wide variety of entities such as unions, companies, employees, work groups, and policy 
advocates.  Employees’ use of the Internet at work—from communications made while at the 
worksite to work done exclusively as a telecommuter—has continued to grow drastically.  In the 
October 2003 supplement to the Current Population Survey, the Bureau of Labor Statistics 
(“BLS”) estimated that 55% of all employees used a computer at work and that 42% used the 
Internet, although computer use varies substantially with respect to occupation, industry, and 
education.187 The Board, even as early as 1993, recognized that at some worksites, email had 
“become an important, if not essential, means of communication.”188 That description is far 
more apt today. 
The low cost of electronic communications has made it particularly valuable to unions 
and other groups attempting to organize employees because they provide an affordable means to 
 
186 The appeal of state labor reform to Freeman and other scholars may stem less from their optimism about the 
promise of state reforms than from a strong pessimism regarding the possibility or direction of federal reforms.  
187 See U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., BUREAU OF LAB. STATISTICS, COMPUTER AND INTERNET USE AT WORK IN 2003 2, Table 
A (2005), available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/ciuaw.pdf; see also Joan T. A. Gabel & Nancy 
Mansfield, On the Increasing Presence of Remote Employees:  An Analysis of the Internet’s Impact on Employment 
Law as it Relates to Teleworkers, 2001 U. ILL. J. L. TECH. & POL’Y 233, 235 (2001) (discussing rise in teleworkers).  
Email is not the only popular form of electronic communication for employees; one survey found that 35% of 
employees used instant messaging at work.  See Survey Finds More Employer Policies Focus on Employees’ Email 
than IM, Blogs, 137 DAILY LABOR REPORT (BNA), July 18, 2006, at A-8. 
188 E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 311 N.L.R.B. 893, 919 (1993). 
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reach many employees, especially at small and widely dispersed job sites.189 However, given the 
low rate of private sector unionism, most employees’ use of the Internet for collective action 
takes place in firms that are nonunion.  The Internet provides nonunion firms interested in 
promoting employee voice and cooperation an additional, low-cost means of communicating 
with their employees.  Use of the Internet is not without legal risk, however.  Although to a far 
lesser extent than Internet usage by outside organizers or work groups,190 employees’ freedom to 
use electronic communications to discuss work issues among themselves or with their employer 
faces possible hurdles under the NLRA. 
A threshold issue involving employee Internet use is the extent to which electronic 
communications are treated as concerted activity that is protected by the NLRA.191 The question 
is important given that, in many workplaces, a significant amount of employee interactions occur 
electronically.192 Even where these interactions involve discussions and cooperation with an 
employer, employees must have the freedom to talk among themselves without fear of employer 
interference.  Indeed, whatever value may inure to the employer or employees from enhanced 
 
189 See U-Haul Co. of Cal., 347 N.L.R.B. No. 34, 17 (June 8, 2006) (describing employee organizing drive started by 
downloading information from union website and distributing it to other employees); Frontier Tel. of Rochester, 
Inc., 344 N.L.R.B. No. 153, 8, 10-11 (2006) (finding that employer unlawfully terminated employee who, among 
other union activity, created a Yahoo! webpage to encourage discussions among employees during organizing 
campaign), enforced, 2006 WL 1359938 (2d Cir. May 16, 2006) (Table); Freeman, Web, supra note 74, at 2, 10-11 
(noting that all international unions, and thousands of local unions have websites and describing AFL-CIO’s 
“Working Families Network,” which has over two million email addresses of union “eActivists”). 
190 Nonemployee organizers’ ability to use an employers’ Internet system raises several important issues that are 
beyond the scope of this Article, which focuses on maximizing employee voice and workplace cooperation in an 
economy where the dominant form of workplace governance is based on nonunion, managerial discretion.  These 
issues include whether organizers’ unauthorized use of an employer’s electronic communications system is treated 
the same as organizers’ unauthorized activity on an employer’s real property.  See Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 
U.S. 527, 533 (1992) (holding that employer can exclude organizers from its property in a nondiscriminatory 
manner if reasonable alternatives to contacting employees exist); Hirsch, Property Rights, supra note 180 
(discussing Lechmere and proposing new Board analysis for nonemployee right to access cases). 
191 Martin H. Malin & Henry H. Perritt, Jr., The National Labor Relations Act in Cyberspace:  Union Organizing in 
Electronic Workplaces, 49 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 2 (2000) (citing Timekeeping Sys., Inc., 323 N.L.R.B. 244, 248-50 
(1997) (concluding that employee’s email criticism of vacation benefits was protected under the Act); E. I. du Pont 
de Nemours & Co., 311 N.L.R.B. 893, 897 (1993) (finding that employer unlawfully barred union literature from 
company email system)). 
192 See supra note 187; Elena N. Broder, Note, (Net)workers’ Rights:  The NLRA and Employee Electronic 
Communications, 105 Yale L.J. 1639, 1657 (1996). 
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employee voice is dependent on a free flow of information.  If employees fear that their 
comments, suggestions, or requests will result in adverse employment actions, they are unlikely 
to participate in meaningful workplace communications.  Having an independent third party—
the NLRB—guarantee and protect employees’ right to communicate without undue employer 
interference could be an important safeguard that helps to foster workplace participation. 
The potential for employers to react negatively to employee comments is not far-fetched.  
Lower-level supervisors and managers, in particular, may be more concerned with their personal 
interests than that of the firm as a whole.193 Yet, the performance of these supervisors and 
managers is likely to be an important piece of information that employees possess and employers 
want.194 It is exactly this type of knowledge that can provide significant benefits for workplace 
cooperation programs—but only if employees believe that they can provide the information 
without suffering adverse actions.  The NLRA is well-suited to safeguard employees in such 
situations.195 
Section 7 of the NLRA protects most employee activity that is concerted—that is, activity 
that seeks to promote or protect employees’ collective workplace interests.196 Thus, an employer 
generally may not engage in any activity that reasonably tends to make employees feel that their 
 
193 See Hirsch, Labor Law Obstacles, supra note 45, at 984-85 & n.186 (noting managerial interests, such as salary 
and job security, that may create a disparity between managers’ interests and the firm’s interests). 
194 See id. at 971-72 (discussing possibility that employees’ increased participation in employee stock ownership 
plans may lead to better monitoring of work). 
195 One private source for this safeguarding role is the Anonymous Employee website, which provides a means for 
employees who fear retaliation to inform, and possibly engage in a dialogue with, their employer about workplace 
problems while maintaining their anonymity.  See http://www.anonymousemployee.com. 
196 Section 7 of the NLRA protects employees’ right to “self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor 
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other 
concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.”  29 U.S.C. § 157.  
Those rights are enforced through Section 8(a)(1), which provides that “[i]t shall be an unfair labor practice for an 
employer to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise” of their Section 7 rights.  Id. § 158(a)(1).  
An employer violates Section 8(a)(1) when its conduct tends to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the 
exercise of their Section 7 rights; evidence of animus or actual coercion is unnecessary.  See Retlaw Broad. Co. v. 
NLRB, 53 F.3d 1002, 1006 (9th Cir. 1995).  Moreover, Section 7 protects collective activity even where no formal 
organization is involved.  See, e.g., NLRB v. Wash. Alum. Co., 370 U.S. 9, 12 (1962); Hyde, New Institutions,
supra note 74, at 520-21. 
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right to engage in concerted activity is chilled.  Typically, Internet usage is considered the same 
as any other traditional, concerted and protected communication.197 This approach makes sense, 
for the means of communications has little or no effect on whether an activity is considered 
concerted and protected under Section 7.  The Internet merely serves as a resource to engage in 
this type of activity and the Board appropriately treats it as such.198 
Because a Section 8(a)(1) violation requires only a “reasonable tendency” to interfere 
with employees’ freedom to engage in protected activity, no matter the motive,199 employers 
must ensure that they not retaliate, even unintentionally, against employees’ electronic 
communications.  An employer that encourages employee participation should make clear to 
employees that they are generally free to communicate with each other and with the employer 
without facing negative consequences.  Punishing an employee for even a highly critical email 
would not only chill employees’ willingness to fully participate in workplace discussions, but 
likely violate Section 8(a)(1) as well.200 
Employees must also be wary.  Complications exist when, as is common, employees use 
 
197 See, e.g., Timekeeping Sys., Inc., 323 N.L.R.B. 244, 247-48 (1997) (finding that employee’s email to other 
employees was concerted and protected activity that was “for the purpose of mutual aid or protection” because the 
email criticized the employer’s proposed vacation policy and implicitly attempted to elicit support from others 
employees to oppose the proposal).  A further problem that may result from increased use of electronic 
communications involves employees who do not work at the primary worksite, such as telecommuters.  Under the 
Board’s long-standing test for determining whether a worker is an employee or an independent contractor, the Board 
considers factors including the hiring party’s right to control the work, the location of the work, and the hiring 
party’s discretion over when and how to work.  St. Joseph News-Press, 345 N.L.R.B. No.31, 7 (2005) (citing 
Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 750-52 (1989)).  Unless the Board adapts its test to 
reflect technological changes that make telecommuting more common and employers better able to maintain control 
over telecommuters, those workers are more likely to be considered independent contractors and excluded from the 
protection of the NLRA.  See 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (exempting independent contractors from NLRA definition of 
employee).  Without the protection of the NLRA, telecommuters will be less likely to participate in a workplace 
cooperative program if they fear the possibility that their employer will retaliate against their contributions to the 
program. 
198 A problem, however, is that many nonunion employees may not realize that their concerted activity is protected 
by the NLRA.  Hyde, Employee Organization, supra note 71, at 499, 507 (noting that nonunion employee activity 
often fails to garner the respect and protection of unionized conduct, perhaps in part because nonunion action does 
not fit the stereotype of NLRA-protected conduct).  
199 See Retlaw Broad, 53 F.3d at 1006. 
200 See Timekeeping Sys., Inc., 323 N.L.R.B. 244, 247-48 (1997). 
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employer-provided Internet services.  An employer’s interests in the operation of its Internet 
system may alter the typical Section 7 balancing test between employee rights and employer 
interests, and that shift may be dispositive in determining whether employee activity on an 
employer’s system is protected.201 Under this balance, an employee’s concerted and otherwise 
protected action will lose Section 7 protection if it unreasonably interferes with the employer’s 
business interests.  For example, in Washington Adventist Hospital, Inc.,202 the Board found that 
a nonunion employee’s email critical of its employer was not protected by the Act because it 
automatically appeared on all computers and required a user to delete the message to remove it 
from the screen.203 According to the Board, this email interrupted employees’ work during a 
busy time and took over the system as medical information was being entered.204 Although a 
similar message that lacked such an effect would generally be protected,205 the Board will likely 
continue to find that emails causing disruptions to the extent of what occurred in Washington 
Adventist are excessive.  The result is that employees must be careful in how they use their 
employer’s Internet system. 
 
201 See, e.g., Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263, 269 (1965) (holding that “it is 
only when the interference with [Section] 7 rights outweighs the business justification for the employer’s action that 
[Section] 8(a)(1) is violated”).  Given this Article’s focus on employer-initiated workplace cooperation schemes, we 
do not address problems involving employer attempts to broadly restrict employees’ use of the Internet or email, 
which implicates the Republic Aviation line of cases.  See Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 801 
(1945) (holding that, with some exceptions, employers cannot prohibit discussions among employees about 
concerted and protected topics during non-work time and in non-work areas); Adrantz, ABB Daimler-Benz Transp., 
331 N.L.R.B. 852, 293 (2000) (finding that employer’s broad ban against all non-work emails, which was not 
regularly enforced against personal emails, was valid), enforcement denied on other grounds, 253 F.3d 19 (D.C. Cir. 
2001).  Instead, where an employer authorizes some employee use of its electronic communication system, the 
greater threat is retaliation against specific messages and the chilling effect of surveillance and monitoring of those 
communications. 
202 291 N.L.R.B. 95 (1988) (finding that employer did not unlawfully fire employee). 
203 Id. at 102. 
204 Id. 
205 See, e.g., Timekeeping Sys., Inc., 323 N.L.R.B. 244, 247-49 (1997) (expressly distinguishing Washington 
Adventist and finding that use of employer’s email system to send messages criticizing employer’s vacation policy 
proposal was protected activity); Malin & Perritt, supra note 191, at 57 (arguing that employer should have to prove 
an actual, significant disruption before barring employee email solicitations). 
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Another issue centers on whether employer’s surveillance of employees’ electronic 
communications—or the creation of an impression of such surveillance—may unlawfully chill 
employees’ ability to engage in meaningful discussions with one another about workplace issues.  
In particular, the monitoring of employees’ Internet use, which many employers now do as a 
routine matter,206 may constitute unlawful surveillance if some of those communications involve 
subjects related to protected activity.207 Employees participating in an employer-sponsored work 
group are susceptible to this risk, as they are likely to be in contact with other employees to 
discuss their views on workplace matters.  If the employer monitors emails, a reasonable 
employee is likely to feel hesitant about criticizing her employer or supervisor.  That chilling 
effect could undermine the value of workplace participation programs and violate the Act. 
The Board’s well-established surveillance law seeks to minimize the chilling effect on 
protected conduct by reducing the risk that employees believe that their employer is taking 
special efforts to monitor their collective activity.208 Thus, absent sufficient justification, an 
employer violates the NLRA by observing employees engaged in protected activity or making an 
impression that they are engaging in such observations.209 Sufficient justification for 
 
206 One 2005 survey found that 76% of employers monitored the Internet use of at least some of its employees.  See 
Study Finds 76 Percent of Respondents Monitor Internet Usage by Employees, 100 DAILY LABOR REPORT (BNA), 
May 25, 2005, at A-8 (finding also that 62% of employer monitor Internet use of all of their employees). 
207 Moreover, attempts to use an employer-controlled system without authorization risks violating the federal 
Electronic Communications Privacy Act (“ECPA”).  In the ECPA, Congress enacted the Stored Communications 
Act, which makes it a crime to “intentionally access[ ] without authorization a facility through which an electronic 
communication service is provided . . . and thereby obtain[ ] . . . access to a wire or electronic communication while 
it is in electronic storage in such system.”  18 U.S.C. § 2701(a)(1); see id. § 2701(c)(2) (exempting conduct 
authorized by user of service); Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868, 879-80 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that 
employer’s access to employee’s restricted-access site may violate Stored Communications Act).  The ECPA, 
however, contains an exception in certain instances for employer monitoring of workplace communications.  See, 
e.g., 2701(c)(1) (monitoring employer’s own service); Malin & Perritt, supra note 191, at 38-40 (citing exceptions). 
208 See Nat’l Steel & Shipbuilding Co. v. NLRB, 156 F.3d 1268, 1271 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (holding that photographing 
or videotaping protected activity has tendency to intimidate employees); Belcher Towing Co. v. NLRB, 726 F.2d 
705, 708 (11th Cir. 1984) (holding that, although surveillance is not per se unlawful, it has “natural, if not 
presumptive, tendency to discourage [union] activity”). 
209 See Snyder’s of Hanover v. NLRB, 39 F. App’x 730, 736-37 (3d Cir. 2002) (watching employees take handbills); 
United States Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 682 F.2d 98, 101-02 (3d Cir. 1982); Ingram Book Co., 315 NLRB 515, 518 
(1994).  An impression of surveillance violation occurs where, “under all the relevant circumstances, reasonable 
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surveillance exists where an employer can show the existence of a reasonable threat of violence 
or other misconduct that would affect the employer’s business.210 
The key issue regarding an employer’s monitoring of electronic communications is 
whether a sufficient business justification exists.  This inquiry should depend on whether the 
employer’s monitoring resembles a program that merely screens electronic communications for 
certain words or other indications of improper usage (e.g., pornography), or the monitoring 
regularly reports the content of communications or the identities of employees using the Internet.  
Both circumstances could reasonably lead employees to believe that the employer is monitoring 
their protected discussions.  The latter example, however, has a far weaker business justification, 
thereby failing to defend the employer’s surveillance and increasing the interference with 
employees’ ability to communicate with each other without fear of retaliation.  In short, an 
employer should have few problems if it does not attempt to monitor specific communications 
related to protected activity and does not generally monitor the substance of Internet activity.  
Employers, however, must be careful not to make their observations too broad or specific. 
Regardless of the NLRB’s approach to the issues of protection and surveillance of 
electronic communications, the Internet will continue to play a large role in the workplace.  The 
NLRA, however, will have an impact on the Internet’s ability to foster collective action.  That 
impact will be most significant with regard to outside groups’ ability to contact workers in the 
 
employees would assume from [the employer’s action or statement] that their union or other protected activities had 
been placed under surveillance.”  Frontier Tel. of Rochester, Inc., 344 N.L.R.B. No. 153, 8, 9 (2006) (citing 
Flexsteel Indus., 311 N.L.R.B. 257 (1993); Schrementi Bros., 179 N.L.R.B. 853 (1969)), enforced, 2006 WL 
1359938 (2d Cir. May 16, 2006) (Table).  An impression of surveillance finding does not require that employees 
attempted to keep their activity secret or that the employer used unlawful means to obtain knowledge of the 
employees’ activity.  Id. at 9 (citing United Charter Serv., 306 N.L.R.B. 150, 151 (1992)). 
210 See Nat’l Steel, 156 F.3d at 1271 (holding that “reasonable, objective justification,” such as legitimate security 
interests, gathering evidence for legal proceeding, or reasonable anticipation of misconduct, will mitigate tendency 
to coerce).  Explaining to employees why the surveillance is necessary will be an important part of this justification.  
Cf. Teletech Holdings, Inc., 333 N.L.R.B. No. 56, 2001 WL 209470, at *3 (2001) (concluding that employer must 
clarify for employees a facially overbroad no-distribution rule to rebut presumption of unlawfulness). 
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face of employer resistance,211 but the Act does have some relevance to employer-sponsored 
worker participation programs.  To be sure, employers that are willing to encourage worker voice 
are less likely to interfere with employees’ freedom to exercise that voice.  Nevertheless, the 
NLRA can protect employees’ freedom to use electronic communications while participating in 
employer-sponsored cooperation programs.  This protection will encourage employee voice and 
cooperation that is more honest and representative of other employees’ interest, which will in 
turn make workplace participation programs more useful. 
CONCLUSION 
Over the past 70 years, the NLRA has played an important role in the development of 
private sector unionization.  The NLRA’s current role has become marginalized, however, 
largely failing to serve well either the small private union sector or the large nonunion sector.  
This failure is most pronounced with regard to the demand for, and potential gains from, greater 
workplace voice and cooperation in many nonunion workplaces.  To the extent that mutual 
employer and worker gains are to be realized, they will occur largely through non-mandated 
employer workplace norms in nonunion establishments.  Accordingly the NLRA should foster 
the development of employee voice in the nonunion sector; however, the statute more frequently 
acts as a hurdle than a spur to welfare-enhancing workplace communications and cooperation. 
We have suggested labor and employment law reforms that might facilitate the 
development of greater voice and cooperation in the nonunion private sector, while providing the 
impetus for unions to create joint value and flourish in an increasingly competitive world.  
Specifically, we suggest weakening the NLRA’s company union prohibition in a manner that 
would permit more employer-supported work groups, as they will often serve as the best option 
for employee voice in the largely nonunion private sector.  Other possible reforms include 
 
211 See supra note 190. 
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changing the nonunion labor law default, allowing for conditional deregulation that encourages 
the development of independent workers councils as a substitute for governmental mandates, and 
greater experimentation and competition in state and local labor regulations.  Finally, labor law 
should recognize the lower costs of communication and coordination associated with the 
Internet, encouraging its use to enhance workplace voice and participation. 
Unfortunately, the most likely prospect for the near future is the absence of significant 
policy innovations.  With or without major changes, however, evolutionary transformation in the 
workplace will continue as economic agents react to changing opportunities and constraints.  
Rather than relying on a labor law regime designed for a different era, or increasing the use of 
federal “one-size fits all” labor regulations, there exists a better way.  Employment and labor law 
reforms that encourage and facilitate the evolution and development of nonunion workplace 
voice and cooperation can best satisfy the diverse needs of workers, employers, and society in 
the modern economy. 
